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The Right of the People
to Be Secure
BY RONALD I BACIGAL*
INTRODUCMON
[The Fourth Amendment m]ore than any other single constitutional
provision ... stands between us and a police state, for its central
premise is that police (or other governmental) conduct that interferes
with a person's liberty, bodily integrity, or right to exclude others from
what is hers shall be subject to judicial control .....
The opening words of the Fourth Amendment establish "[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons."2 However, the latest word
from the Supreme Court is that innocent persons may be confronted,
intimidated, and pursued at the whim of police officers? The once lofty
goal of regulating governmental power is now pertinent only when police
efforts to capture a citizen culminate in physical contact or surrender.4
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
B.S. 1964, Concord College; LL.B. 1967, Washington and Lee University School of
Law.
I 'Jms BoYD WHrm, JusTIC AS TRANsLATION 177 (1990). "Among deprivations
of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual
and putting ten-or in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and
most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (.ackson, J., dissenting).
2 The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmnation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1562 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ('Today's qualification of the Fourth Amendment means that innocent citizens
may remain 'secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures' only
at the discretion of the police.").
4 "An arrest requires either physical force [such as a seizure, consisting of 'alaying
on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement,' 111 S. Ct. at 1550,]
or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority." Id. at 1551.
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Although the Fourth Amendment continues to impose restrictions on a police
officer's "merely touching, however slightly, the body of the accused, ' "a
police officer may now fire his weapon at an innocent citizen and not
implicate the Fourth Amendment-as long as he misses his target."6
This curious constitutional doctrine is the latest manifestation of the
Court's "surreal and Orwellian 7 view of personal security rights in contem-
porary America. The Court previously revealed its vision of our nation by
holding that a traveller entering our country can be held for hours without a
warrant or probable cause until she either consents to an x-ray or performs a
monitored bowel movement.8 The Court has also held that motorists who
have aroused no suspicion whatsoever can be stopped at sobriety check-
points9 or subjected to a high speed pursuit, which may culminate in a fatal
crash." This distressing view of individual freedoms in America was most
recently manifested in the Court decisions holding that the amendment does
not encompass "accidental" or "attempted" seizures of persons.
Accidental seizures' are said to be beyond the scope of a Fourth
Amendment that encompasses only those situations in which the government
intends to capture a specific individual in a precise manner. In all other
situations, government agents do not even need to comply with the amend-
ment's minimal requirement that they act reasonably. Thus, the Fourth
Amendment is inapplicable when an innocent citizen is shot by the police, as
long as the shot was intended for a criminal suspect' or was intended to.
mark a suspect's vehicle for later identification."
5 Id. at 1550 (citation omitted).
6 Id. at 1552 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
' In State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 1849 (1993),
concurring Justice Levinson referred to "the surreal and Orwellian world of [Florida v.
Boyer, California v. Hodari D., and Florida v. Bostick], in which the fourth amendment
[sic] ... seems to have atrophied to the condition of a vestigal organ." Id. at 365
(citations omitted).
'United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542-44 (1985).
'Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 113-14 for the Court's discussion of Tennessee
v. Garner in Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595 (1989).
11 See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97; see also infra text accompanying note 147. See
generally Kathryn R. Urbonya, "Accidental" Shootings as Fourth Amendment Seizures,
20 HASTINGs CONST. L.Q. 337 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court'svarious definitions
of "seizure" in Teny v. Ohio, United Sates v. Mendenhall, and Florida v. Bostick).
12 Rucker v. Harford County, Md., 946 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that
no seizure occurs when a bystander is struck by a bullet intended for a suspect), cert
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992); Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosine, 906 F.2d 791, 798 (1st
Cir. 1990) (holding that there has been no seizure under the Fourth Amendment unless
the restraint of liberty results from an attempt to gain control of the particular individual).
'3 See Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428, 1432 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that a
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Attempted seizures" are viewed as lying beyond the coverage of a
Fourth Amendment that remains indifferent to a police officer's initial
pursuit, intimidation, or other unsuccessful efforts to seize a citizen."
Citizens who walk the streets of America must now accept the possibility
that an officer may fire upon them, attempt to tackle them to the ground,
or single out a particular citizen and demand identification papers and an
explanation of why the individual is in the area. Citizens must anticipate
the occurrence of each of these situations despite the absence of any
indication that they are engaged in criminal activity.6
Faced with conflicting demands for "safe streets" and for freedom of
movement on those streets, a conservative Supreme Court indirectly
increased law enforcement powers by decreasing the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.' By creating the novel concepts of accidental
seizure and attempted seizure, this avowedly conservative Court has
displayed a facility for constitutional interpretation that is simultaneously
radical and regressive. The Court's refusal to address police attempts to
seize a suspect threatens to overturn Teny v. Ohio8 by reverting to
common law concepts of completed arrests. The refusal to recognize
accidental seizures stems from an unprecedented and ill-conceived
analysis which suggests that a police officer's intent to utilize a particular
method of capture is a prerequisite for Fourth Amendment seizures. The
seizure does not occur when an officer shoots and strkes a vehicle if the vehicle does not
stop, even if the officer meant to stop a suspect within it); Palmer v. Williamson, 717 F.
Supp. 1218, 1223 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that although the police fired at and struck
the suspect's vehicle, no seizure occurred because the suspect failed to stop).
14 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991); see infra text
accompanying notes 212-14.
" Hoda; 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1561-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('The Court
today defines a seizure as commencing, not with egregious police conduct, but rather,
with submission by the citizen."); Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992)
(citations omitted) ('The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures not
unreasonable, unjustified or outrageous conduct in general. Therefore, pre-seizure conduct
is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.").
16 See infra text accompanying note 218.
17 Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1552. Hodari does more than legitimize
demands for safe streets; it removes and protects part of the government's efforts to clean
up the streets-certain types of seizures-from regulation by law. Even before Hodari, one
district court noted the following- "It seems rather incongruous at this point in the world's
history that we find totalitarian states becoming more like our free society while we in
this nation are taking on their former trappings of suppressed liberties and freedoms."
United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 788 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
" 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see infra text accompanying note 219.
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Court, however, has erred on both counts because the Fourth Amendment
properly encompasses both attempted and accidental seizures. The Court'
miscalculation stems from the drawing of an unwarranted distinction between
searches and seizures of property, and seizures of a person.
Part I of this Article defines searches and seizures of property and person,
discussing the Supreme Court's initially broad interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment and its subsequent narrowing in later decisions. 9 Part II
discusses several police "chase cases" leading up to the elimination of
accidental and attempted seizures from Fourth Amendment protection in
Brower v. County of Inyo2' and California v. Hodari D!' Part III analyzes
the Brower decision and its effect on accidental seizures, concluding that the
analysis set forth therein should be abolished and advocating an alternate
test.' Part IV confronts the Court's elimination of attempted seizures from
Fourth Amendment protections and suggests that physical restraint cannot be
the only consideratione Part V offers a new model for defining attempted
seizures, one which focuses on a citizen's right of liberty rather than on the
physical control of citizens by the police.
I DpFINuNG SEARCHES AND SEIzUREs
By insisting that no seizure of a person occurs until a police officer
intentionally and successfully touches the citizen or until the citizen
submits to police authority, the Court has created an intractable
approach to seizures of a person that stands in stark contrast to its
relatively malleable treatment of searches and seizures of property.
Judicial efforts to define searches and seizures of property have
engendered learned debate over the fundamental values underlying a
broadly defined conflict between individual freedom 6 and collective
'o See infra notes 25-85 and accompanying text.
o 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
2 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991); see infra notes 86-144 and accompanying
text.
" See infra notes 145-211 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 212-351 and accompanying text.
z' See infra notes 352-409 and accompanying text.
25 See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
In the context of Fourth Amendment searches, the debate centers on the right of
privacy: in other words, the freedom "of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated
to others." Oscar M. Ruebhausen, Foreword to ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
7 (1968).
[Vol 82
RIGHT TO BE SECURE
security.27 In contrast, the Court's definition of seizures of a person,
substitutes in place of its examination of these fundamental values,
inquiries into the existence of certain factual predicates, such as physical
touching, submission, and the officer's intent to capture the citizen
through particular means.' The language of the Fourth Amendment,
which equally prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of persons,
houses, papers, and effects, does not support such a distinction between
seizures of the person and searches and seizures of a person's proper-
ty.2
The seminal decisions defining searches and seizures, Katz v. United
Statesw ' and Teny v. Ohio," also fail to support the distinction drawn by
the current Court. Prior to Katz, the Court had held that physical trespass
to the defendant's property was a necessary factual predicate for the
triggering of the amendment's coverage of governmental searches.'
When Katz shifted the amendment's focus from property rights to the
fundamental right of privacy, the requirement of physical trespass was
discarded.3 Despite warnings that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be
translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy,"' post-Katz
litigation has centered on the privacy issue and the Court's need to
' "The fourth amendment [sic] is one of the Constitution's richly generative texts.
Its important terms are general .... The amendment invites treatment as a broad
statement about the relationship between an individual and the government.' Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47 (1974); see
also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that
the Court must assess the "impact on the individual's sense of security balanced against
the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement); JACOB W. LANDYNSKi,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 13 (1966) (Fourth Amendment issues
"bring into sharp focus the classic dilemma of order vs. liberty in the democratic state").
According to Justice Jackson, the Bill of Rights can be viewed as "the maximum
restrictions upon the power of organized society over the individual that are compatible
with the maintenance of organized society itself." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). See generally Daniel J. O'Hern, Criminal Law and
Procedure: The Conflict Between Order and Liberty, 1 SEToN HALL CONST. L.J. 3 (1990)
(discussing how the Constitution embodies a conflict between order and liberty).
' See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
29See supra note 2.
30 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
32 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.'
3Id. at 353 ("[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects
people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes
clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.').
3 Id. at 350.
1993-94]
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determine which privacy values are recognized by society as 'justifiable"
or "legitimate"35 and, therefore, protected.
While the pre-Katz requirement for physical trespass necessitated a
factual determination, legitimate expectations of privacy cannot be
determined by the factual expectations currently held by a majority of
today's society.' Because the Constitution protects the individual against
the tyranny of the current majority,37 the Court has tempered popular
consensus' with history," property rights,4 natural law," and utilitarian
balancing 2 in determining whether there has been governmental inter-
ference with a constitutionally protected right of privacy.
When Fourth Amendment analysis turns from searches and seizures
of property to seizures of the person, the focal point of judicial scrutiny
31 The Katz majority overturned the previous requirement thatthe Fourth Amendment
be triggered by a physical trespass and recognized that the amendment protects people,
not places. It was left to the concurring opinion to suggest that the people are protected
when they hold an expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable."' Id. at 361 (Harlan, L, concurring). In order to avoid confusing society's
reasonable expectations with those of a reasonable person, the Court has substituted the
terms 'Justifiable," United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971), and "legitimate,"
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978), in place of the word "reasonable."
' Rather than asking what we currently expect of government officials, the Fourth
Amendment tells us "what we should demand of government" Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974).
7 
"ITlhe task of the law [is] to form and project, as well as minor and reflect....
White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In times of panic or emergency, popular
consensus may seek to override individual rights. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 490-91 (1945); see also Tom Wicker,
Rights vs. Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1989, at A25 (reporting that a Washington
Post/ABC News Poll found that "52 percent of respondents were willing to have their
houses searched and 67 percent to have their cars stopped and searched by police without
a warrant. Fifty-five percent supported mandatory drug testing' for the general population,
and 67 percent supported testing for all high school students).
' The shared understandings of society are relevant in determining legitimate
expectations of privacy. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. These shared understandings,
however, are more than the current popular consensus. See supra note 36. In order to
preserve the Constitution as a protection against the tyranny of the majority, the Court
must employ some independent standard to distinguish "enlightened" consensus from a
current wave of consensus based on emotionalism or prejudice. See RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 126 (1977).
39 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415-16 & n.4 (1976).
40 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 ("Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law
must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of
real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society.").
4 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42 See Cana= v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-39 (1967).
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shifts from privacy interests to the citizen's fundamental interests in
liberty43 and freedom of movementM This change in focus merely
presents a different context in which the Court must identify those
societal values that the Fourth Amendment recognizes as legitimate or
justifiable. Because concepts of privacy and liberty often overlap, the
methodology utilized to identify legitimate privacy expectations would
seem to apply equally to determinations of legitimate expectations of
liberty 5 Yet when addressing seizures of a person, the Court has
abandoned its multi-faceted examination of history,"' property rights,"7
popular consensus,4' and utilitarian balancing4" in favor of narrowly
focused inquiries into the factual predicates of common law arrests. The
Court has never explained why the Katz analysis of legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy applies to searches and seizures of property, while an
entirely different analysis governs seizures of a person.
Katz and Teny, decided within a year of one another, share a
common characteristic of expanding Fourth Amendment protections
beyond common law precedents 0 Pre-Teny analysis had equated seizures
of a person with common law arrests." Thus, the Court in Terry was
asked to make an all-or-nothing determination: either there was an arrest,
requiring full compliance with the Fourth Amendment, or there was no
arrest, and therefore no seizure, and no Fourth Amendment limitations on
a police officer's actions. 2 Just as physical trespass was essential to pre-
Katz searches,53 arrest was a necessary linchpin for pre-Terry seizures of
41 In its broadest context, the term liberty" encompasses an individual's right of
autonomy-4he right to live one's life without arbitrary interference by the state. See Louis
HenkIn, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1415 (1974).
4 See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 1258, 1297-1307 (1990).
41 "Under the principles established and applied by this Court, the Fourth Amend-
ment safeguards against all evils that are like and equivalent to those embraced within the
ordinary meaning of its words." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 488 (1928)
(Butler, J., dissenting).
See sulpra note 39 and accompanying text.
See slqra note 40 and accompanying text.
'7See supra notes 36, 38 and accompanying text.
'7See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
'0 See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1555 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (''he expansive construction of the word 'seizure'in the Katz case provided
an appropriate predicate for the Court'sholding in Teny v. Ohio... .") (citation omitted).
'1 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
'2 The Court's decision to deny Fourth Amendment application freed the police
officer from any judicial scrutiny of the officer's decision to engage in the exempted
practice. See infra note 310.
"See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
1993-941
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the person. Teny, however, extended the scope of the amendment to
encompass temporary detentions falling short of full custodial arrests.ss
Together, Katz and Teny emphasized a result-an intrusion upon privacy or
liberty-in place of the previous focus on whether a particular means-such as
trespass or arrest-had been utilized to bring about that result.
Under the specific facts of Teny, the relevant liberty interest was the
citizen's "freedom to walk away," unencumbered by any physical restraint
imposed by a police officer. While concentrating on that limited issue, the
Teny Court rose above the precise facts of the case by reaffirming its
"traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbear-
ing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security" and by
recognizing that a seizure occurs "when the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of the
citizen. 58 Terry, like Katz, freed the amendment from restrictive common
law factual predicates and evoked the expansive concept of a "right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."59
Whether or not it is truly the "most valued," the right to be let alone-to
be free from arbitrary governmental interference with our lives--indeniably
qualifies as a fundamental value underlying the amendment proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures of both property and persons. The Court
post-Katz analysis continues to affirm that this fundamental value extends the
protections of the amendment beyond common law definitions of searches
and seizures of property.6 In contrast, however, the Court insists that
common law concepts of arrest restrict the definition of seizures of a
person.6' Thus, the Court has discarded Teny's broad pledge to scrutinize the
- See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
" Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980) ("[TIhe officer 'seized'
Terry and subjected him to a 'search' when he took hold of him, spun him around, and
patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing.") (citation omitted).
Teny, 392 U.S. at 15.
"8 Id at 19 n.16 (emphasis added); see California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111
S. Ct. 1547, 1556 (1991) (Stevens, ., dissenting) ('Che touchstone of a seizure is the
restraint of an individual's personal liberty 'insome way.").
"' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, ., dissenting).
"[T"he right to be left alone is 'tooprecious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job
is the detection of crime."' People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 569 (N.Y. 1976) (quoting
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)).
60 Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1551 n.3 ("What Katz stands for is the
proposition that items which could not be subject to seizure at common law (e.g.,
telephone conversations) can be seized under the Fourth Amendment.").
6111 S. Ct. at 1551 aL3 (noting that the common law of arrests "defines the limits
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diverse ways in which the government may repress a citizen's liberty in
favor of giving Teny its narrowest reading. Consequently, the precise
facts that gave rise to the Teny decision-the government's corporeal
restraint of the suspect's physical movements-have become the exclusive
criteria for defining Fourth Amendment seizures of a person. This
constricted reading of Terry reduces the Fourth Amendment rights of
liberty and personal security to a narrow right of physical locomotion.'
Now banished from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are the expansive
concept of a "right to be let alone" and the related view that the
amendment is applicable to all significant forms of police encounters with
citizens.63
The sole modification of Teny's focus on corporeal restraint occurred
in United States v. Mendenhall," wherein the Court suggested that
seizures of a person could be identified by examining whether the totality
of the circumstances would lead a reasonable person to perceive that he
was not free to leave.' While there is some affinity between the freedom
to leave and the right to be let alone, subsequent decisions have not borne
out Mendenhall's potential for expanding Fourth Amendment coverage
beyond a right to physical locomotion.
In a decade of ensuing litigation, the question arose whether
Mendenhall's reasonable perceptions standard' was a supplement to, or
a substitute for, Teny's emphasis on corporeal restraint.' In other words,
if there is a conflict between reality and perception, which factor is
controlling? The question posed is the Fourth Amendment's variation of
the classic query for beginning students of epistemology-if a tree falls in
an unoccupied forest, has there been a sound? In the Fourth Amendment
context, the riddle consists of a hypothetical situation where police
officers surround a suspect's dwelling to insure that he does not depart the
premises, but the suspect remains unaware of the officers" presence."
of a seizure of the person").
" See Maclin, supra note 44, at 1297-1307.
s See infra note 170.
446 U.S. 544 (1980).
aId at 554.
"Id.
See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
"This hypothetical does not require the Court to inquire into the officer's subjective
intent because the external and unequivocal manifestations of control exisL See infra note
93. The hypothetical is based on the facts of State v. White, 838 P.2d 605 (Or. Ct. App.
1992), where the police surrounded the defendant's dwelling and the defendant complied
with the order that he exit the dwelling. The majority and concurring opinions differed
as to whether the defendant had been seized while still inside the house, id. at 609-12
1993-94]
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This hypothetical situation demonstrates that a restriction of the defen-
dant's liberty69 may occur without his awareness of that fact,7" just as a
clandestine search of the defendant's property may occur without his
knowledge." If Mendenhall's focus upon reasonable perception? is the
exclusive test for defining seizures of a person, the definitions of seizures
of property and seizures of a person are strangely juxtaposed. A covert
governmental intrusion upon privacy triggers Fourth Amendment
protections, while a covert intrusion upon an individual's liberty or
freedom of movement lacks constitutional significance until it is
accompanied by perception of the intrusion. 3
(Durham, J., concurring), or not until he had exited the dwelling. Ia at 608 (majority
opinion).
Although the suspect remains free to move about inside his residence, he is not
free to depart. Cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (holding that no seizure
occurred by stationing guards at exits because the guards' purpose was not to prevent exit,
but to ensure that all persons were questioned).
7o Bouldin v. State, 350 A.2d 130, 133 (Md. 1976) ("[lIt is only where there is no
actual manual seizure of the arrested person that his intention or understanding assumes
controlling importance."); City of Seattle v. Sage, 523 P.2d 942, 945 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974) ("A person is placed under arrest when he is deprived of his liberty by an officer
who intends to arrest him. The arresting officer does not need to orally communicate this
intent to the person being arrested.").
While the criminal law does not require that one be aware of a restraint on his
liberty, "[tjhe original Restatement of Torts took the position that there was no false
imprisonment unless the victim was aware of the confinement at the time." ROLLIN M.
PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 228-29 (3d ed. 1982) (citing RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 42 (1934)). Dean Prosser brought attention to the unsoundness of this
position in William L. Prosser, False Imprisonment: Consciousness of Confinement, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1955). The Restatement (Second) of Torts states "in substance that
it is false imprisonment if the victim is aware of the confinement at the time 'oris hanned
thereby."' PERKINs & BOYCE, supra, at 229 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 42 (1965)). Because "the purpose of the criminal law is not to compensate the victim
for harm suffered ... but to punish the actor for his misconduct it would seem that false
imprisonment as a criminal offense would not require that the victim either be conscious
of the confinement at the time or be harmed thereby." Id.
Even if the government's act of secretly surrounding a citizen's home is characterized
as merely an attempted seizure, the Fourth Amendment should cover such an attempt. But
see infra note 348 and accompanying text.
71 Weinreb, supra note 27, at 53 ("A person's home is a place that he expects will
not be invaded whether he is present or absent.").
r See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
But see EDWIN FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST, Chapter IV at 52-53 (1967) ("[A]n
unconscious person may be placed under arrest when his body is actually seized and
restrained, even though his understanding of his plight is delayed until he recovers
consciousness.").
[Vol. 82
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The other side of the Teny/Mendenhall paradox is whether the amend-
ment applies when there is the perception, but not the reality, of restraint; that
is, someone hears a filling tree, but in fact no tree fell. For example, consider
a situation in which a motorist observes an officer in a trailing police car
activate the car' siren and flashing lights. As the motorist pulls over to the
side of the road, believing that the police have constrained his freedom of
movement, the police officer passes him in order to stop a vehicle further
down the highway.74 The motorist's mistaken, but perfectly reasonable,
perception of government-imposed restraint7 satisfies the Mendenhall test
for a seizure of the person, even though the police had no intent to interfere
with the defendant's freedom of movement.76
Dicta in Brower v. County of Iyo 77 implicitly resolved situations like
the "mistaken motorist" hypothetical. The Court in Brower declared that the
Fourth Amendment does not encompass "the accidental effects of otherwise
lawful govemment conduct '78 and that no seizure occurs unless the police
utilize "means intentionally applied79 to bring about the seizure. In essence,
Brower proclaimed that constraint of a person does not reach constitutional
significance if the police do not intend for the constraint to occur. While
Browers language regarding police intent purports to eliminate accidental
seizures0 from Fourth Amendment coverage, Brower does not establish the
point at which an intended seizure becomes an accomplished seizure. If an
officer turns on a police car's siren and flashing lights with the intent to seize
a particular motorist, does a seizure occur when the siren and lights are
activated or only when the motorist acquiesces to this show of authority by
stopping his vehicle?8' The Court addressed this question in California
74 See State v. Indvik, 382 N.W.2d 623, 627 (N.D. 1986) ("There may be several
motorists in the vicinity of an officer when he uses his flashing red lights. To constitute
a stop by the use of flashing red lights, the officer must have the intent to stop the
specific motorist and the motorist must be cognizant of the officer's presence.").
7. In the hypothetical there is self-imposed restraint but only an erroneous perception
of government restraint.
76 In State v. Baldonado, 847 P.2d 751 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992), a police officer pulled
up behind a parked vehicle and turned on the police car's flashing lights. Id. at 752. The
majority opinion held that no seizure occurred if the trial court, on remand, finds that the
police had no intent to seize, but were seeking to provide assistance. Id. at 755. The
dissent argued that, as a matter of law, whatever the officer's purpose, a motorist in such
a situation would not feel free to leave. Id. (Apodaca, J., dissenting).
489 U.S. 593 (1989).
7Id at 596.
9Ia at 597 (emphasis omitted).
go See Ronald J. Bacigal, In Pursuit of the Elusive Fourth Amendment: The Police
Chase Cases, 58 TENN. L. REV. 73, 91 (1990).
8 Justice Stevens posed another wrinkle to this hypothetical:
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v. Hodari D. and held that police intent to restrain a defendant lacks
constitutional significance until the defendant is successfully apprehend-
ed.2 As a result, the Fourth Amendment does not encompass attempted
seizures. 3
The Court's path to Brower and Hodari, and its analysis of accidental
and attempted seizures, can be traced through a series of cases applying
the constitutional standard for seizures within the context of police pursuit
of a fleeing suspect.' These "chase cases" underscore the difficulties of
defining a seizure of the person by forcing the Court to identify the point
at which an attempted seizure becomes an accomplished seizure.' The
chase cases also highlight the Court's consistent refusal to address
seizures of a person under the Katz mandate of adjudicating the legitimate
societal expectations protected by the Fourth Amendment.
If. Tim CHASE CASES
The first of the chase cases, Tennessee v. Garner," arose when a
police officer fired a fatal shot at a fleeing suspect. The Court resolved
the issue of whether a seizure had occurred in a single sentence: "There
can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a
['l]here will be a period of time during which the citizen's liberty has been
restrained, but he or she has not yet completely submitted to the show of force.
A motorist pulled over by a highway patrol car cannot come to an immediate
stop, even if the motorist intends to obey the patrol car's signal. If an officer
decides to make the kind of random stop forbidden by Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648 ... (1979), and, after flashing his lights, but before the vehicle comes
to a complete stop, sees that the license plate has expired, can he justify his
action on the ground that the seizure became lawful after it was initiated but
before it was completed?
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1561 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
2 111 S. Ct. at 1552.
3Ia at 1552.
" See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Michigan v. Chestemut, 486
U.S. 567 (1988); Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
" The Court has never found an attempted but unsuccessful seizure of a person to
be covered by the Fourth Amendment. Garner and Brower involve seizures where the
suspect was successfily captured. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text
(discussing Garner); infra notes 105-22 and accompanying text (discussing Brower).
Chesternut and Hodari focus on the seizure of evidentiary items that were obtained before
the suspect was captured. See inra notes 91-104 and accompanying text (discussing
Chesterut); infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text (discussing Hodan.
" 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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seizure."' After passing quickly over the threshold question of the
Fourth Amendment's coverage, the Garner Court focused on the
amendment's substantive requirement that seizures be reasonable, and that
reasonableness hinges upon striking the constitutionally appropriate
balance between law enforcement needs and the rights of suspects.' By
concluding that the need to apprehend fleeing felons did not "justify the
killing of nonviolent suspects,"' the Court removed the unrestricted use
of deadly force from the arsenal of police pursuit."° The Court's willing-
ness to address the reasonableness of police pursuit diminished, however,
in subsequent chase cases in which the Court invoked a narrow and rigid
view of seizures of the person.
Garner was followed by Michigan v. Chesternut," a chase case that
presented the Court with sharply contrasting theories for determining
when police pursuit amounts to a Fourth Amendment seizure. The chase
in Chesternut began when a police patrol car approached an intersection
where the defendant was standing.'2 When the defendant turned and ran,
the police drove alongside the defendant 3 and retrieved several packets
of codeine that the defendant had discarded.' In support of his claim
that the police had violated the Fourth Amendment, the defendant argued
that the initiation of a chase constitutes the litmus test for defining a
seizure.95 Thus, according to the defendant, "any and all police 'chases'
are Fourth Amendment seizures, ... [and] the police may never pursue
an individual absent a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
that he is engaged in criminal activity."96 The government, on the other
hand, asserted that "a lack of objective and particularized suspicion would
not poison police conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police
did not succeed in actually apprehending the individual."97 Anticipating
"7 Id at 7.
'9Id at 8.
Id at 10.
10Id at 22.
11 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
92 Id at 569.
"The officer testified that "the goal of the 'chase'was not to capture the defendant],
'but to see where he was going."' The Court noted that "the subjective intent of the
officers is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police
conduct only to the extent that that intent has been conveyed to the person confronted"
Id at 576 n.7.
"Id at 569.
9"Id at 572.
9Id
97Id
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the holding in Hodari,9" the government insisted that successful appre-
hension of the suspect should be the determinative factor in defining
seizures."
Although Justices Kennedy and Scalia adopted the government's
position,"ss the majority in Chesternut refused to define a seizure by
reference to a single factual occurrence, whether the fact be the pursuit
itself or the actual apprehension of the suspect."0' Instead, the Court
applied Mendenhall's totality of the circumstances teste2 and concluded
that the police conduct in question "was not 'so intimidating' that [the
defendant] could reasonably have believed that he was not free to
disregard the police presence and go about his business." ' The Court
ruled that because no seizure took place, the officers were not required
to have a reasonable basis for following the defendants."ss Therefore,
the Court did not even consider whether the chase of the suspect was
motivated by idle curiosity or by a legitimate government interest.
The next chase case to reach the Court, Brower v. County of
Inyo,'° involved a suspect who was killed when he crashed into a police
roadblock following a high speed chase over approximately twenty
miles."0 The suspect's heirs brought a 42 U.S.C. § 198307 suit claim-
ing that the police used brutal and unnecessary physical force in
establishing the roadblock,' thereby effectuating an unreasonable
See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572.
"' Id at 576, 577 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying note 123.
101 Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574.
" See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
'03 Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 576.
104 Id
101 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
'06 Id at 594.
107 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
6 Petitioners alleged that the police "(1) caused an 18-wheel tractor-trailer to be
placed across both lanes of a two-lane highway in the path of [the suspect's] flight; (2)
'effectively concealed' this roadblock by placing it behind a curve and leaving it
unilluminated; and (3) positioned a police car, with its headlights on, between [the
suspect's] oncoming vehicle and the truck, so that [the suspect] would be 'blinded' on his
approach." Brower, 489 U.S. at 594.
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seizure of the suspect."° The Ninth Circuit declined to address the reason-
ableness of the police conduct because it found that no seizure had taken
place. 10 The court stated that "[pirior to [the suspect] failure to stop
voluntarily, his freedom of movement was never arrested or restrained,...
[and h]e had a number of opportunities to stop his automobile prior to the
impact.""' The Ninth Circuit held that there was no seizure during the
chase itself and that any loss of hlberty accompanying the crash was
attributable to the suspect own actions in continuing to flee pursuing
authorities."
In reversing the decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court cited
Garnes holding that a police officer's fatal shooting of a fleeing suspect
constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure." The Court stated that 'Brower's
independent decision to continue the chase can no more eliminate respon-
dent' responsibility for the termination of his movement effected by the
roadblock than Gamert independent decision to flee eliminated the Memphis
police officer's responsibility for the termination of his movement effected by
the bullet.""
4
The actual holding ofBrower-that a motorist is seized at the point that
he is stopped by a police roadblock erected for the very purpose of stopping
the motoristt 5-is not surprising. Rather, the controversial aspect of Brower
arises from the Courtt affirmation"6 that no seizure occurred in another
chase case, Galas v. McKee,"7 in which a fleeing suspect lost control of
his vehicle and crashed during a high speed chase with the police. In deciding
Galas, the Sixth Circuit noted that the suspect's crash terminated his ability
to walk away and held that "[t]his restraint on plaintiff's freedom to leave...
was not accomplished by the show of authority but occurred as a result of
plaintiff's decision to disregard it.""' 8
10 Id.
"0 Brower v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 547 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 489 U.S. 593
(1989).
... Id at 546.
" Id. In Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1207 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit
had referred to a similar arangement as a "deadman" roadblock and held that the use of
such a device did constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Following the Ninth Circuit's contrary holding in Brower, then, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in order to resolve the conflict among the circuits. Brower, 489 U.S. at
594-95.
1"3 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
114 Brower, 489 U.S. at 595.
". Id. at 599.
116 Id. at 595.
11, 801 F.2d 200, 202 (6th Cir. 1986).
le Id. at 203.
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The Supreme Court agreed that no Fourth Amendment seizure
occurred in Galas because the police "sought to stop the suspect only by
the show of authority represented by flashing lights and continuing
pursuit,91"9 whereas the suspect was in fact physically stopped "by a
different means-his loss of control of his vehicle and the subsequent
crash."'' 0 Galas and Brower were distinguished on grounds that a
seizure must be "not merely the result of government action but the result
of the very means ... that the government selected.' 21 While Brower
had been stopped by a police roadblock erected for the very purpose of
stopping him, it was not police conduct but Galas' own erratic driving,
that caused his crash. Thus, if Brower had swerved into a roadside ditch
instead of crashing directly into the roadblock, he would have fallen
under the parameter of Galas and would not have been seized for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. By focusing on the immediate cause
of each stop of a suspect which in one case was fatal, the Courtimplicitly rejected the contention that a seizure occurred prior to the stop
or when the chase began."
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Brower sought to complete the
task begun by he and Justice Kennedy in Chesternut- eliminate chases
from the lexicon of Fourth Amendment seizures." In Chesternut the
two Justices maintained that "[i]t is at least plausible to say that whether
or not the officers' conduct communicates to a person a reasonable belief
that they intend to apprehend him, such conduct does not implicate
Fourth Amendment protections until it achieves a restraining effect."' 4
The Kennedy/Scalia rationale did not prevail in ChesternuP and, when
it reappeared in Brower, a four person concurrence challenged it as dicta
19 Brower, 489 U.S. at 597.
'
2 Id. at 597.
121 Id. at 597-98.
'" In Brower, the Court "did not even consider the possibility that a seizure could
have occurred during the course of the chase because, as [it] explained, that 'show of
authority' did not produce [the] stop." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct.
1547, 1552 (1991). But see People v. Washington, 236 Cal. Rptr. 840, 843 (Ct. App.
1987) ("Giving chase after an individual in a manner designed to overtake and detain or
encourage the individual to give up his flight is a detention."); In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138,
140 (D.C. 1987) ("When the chase commences, the stop has begun."); Commonwealth
v. Thibeau, 429 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (Mass. 1981) ("[A] stop starts when pursuit begins.').
123 See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 577 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[N]either 'chase'nor 'investigative pursuit' need be included in the lexicon of the Fourth
Amendment.").
4 Id.
12 The majority left "to another day the detennination of the circumstances in which
police pursuit could amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment" Id. at 576 n.9.
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"designed to decide a number of cases not before the Court."' 6 Howev-
er, the issue came squarely before the Court two years later in California
v. Hodari D., when a fleeing suspect discarded drugs which were
retrieved by the pursuing police officer."
The chase in Hodari began when a group of youths fled at the
approach of an unmarked police car.' An officer left the car in an
attempt to cut off the defendant's escape and, through a circuitous route,
came face-to-face with the defendant."' Immediately prior to being
tackled to the ground, the defendant discarded a small quantity of crack
cocaine.' The California Court of Appeals suppressed the cocaine as
the fruit of an illegal seizure after finding that the defendant "had been
'seized'when he saw [the officer] running towards him, [and] that this
seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment' because the State
conceded that the officer did not have the reasonable suspicion required
to justify stopping the defendant.132
In determining the constitutional dimensions of a seizure, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the California court by applying the
common law definitions of arrest 3  According to common law, "[a]n
arrest requires either physical force ... or, where that is absent,
submission to the assertion of authority."''" Neither factual predicate
was met in Hodari until the officer tackled the suspect. The officer's
initial pursuit did not constitute a seizure by physical force because the
defendant "was untouched by [the officer] at the time he discarded the
cocaine." '35  Hodari argued that the officer's pursuit satisfied the
Mendenhall test for a Fourth Amendment seizure or a show of authority
which would cause a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to
leave.'" However, the Court held that no Fourth Amendment seizure
ms Brower, 489 U.S. at 600 (Stevens, 3., concurring).
127 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
m 111 S. Ct. at 1549.
"Id.
3 Id.
13 Id.
- Id. at 1549. The Supreme Court took a gratuitous slap at the State's concession.
'hat it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic
upon the mere sighting of the police is not self-evident, and arguably contdicts
proverbial common sense." Id at 1549 n.1 (citing Proverbs 28:1 ('[TIhe wicked flee
when no man pursueth.")).
n3 Id. at 1549-50.
m Id. at 1551.
1 5 Id. at 1550.
136 Id. at 1551.
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occurs until the defendant yields to a show of authority. 7 Mendenhall's
show of authority requirement was identified as "a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for seizure."" The remaining necessary condition
is the defendant's submission to the show of authority.
Finally, the Hodari Court refused, "even as a policy matter, to stretch
the Fourth Amendment beyond its words and beyond the meaning of
arrest .... Street pursuits always place the public at some risk, and
compliance with police orders to stop should therefore be encour-
aged."'" After presuming that only a few police orders to stop would
be issued without adequate justification, the Court offered assurances that
unlawful orders to stop, when obeyed, could be adequately deterred
through application of the exclusionary rule.4
The history of the chase cases suggests that the Court intends to
-achieve its agenda for enhancing police power by whatever means are
necessary. 4' If attempted seizures can be excluded from Fourth
Amendment coverage by returning to pre-Terry concepts of common law
arrests, the Court appears willing to embrace conservative dogma and
return to common law traditions that influenced the constitutional framers'
original intent. It is unclear, however, which one of several competing
common law traditions was ultimately embraced by the framers."
Although the present Court appears to be most comfortable espousing a
conservative methodology for enhancing police power, when necessary
to achieve its purposes the Court is willing to boldly go where no Court
has gone before. Excluding accidental seizures from the amendment's
coverage necessitated a break with precedent'" and a peculiar analysis
"' "The nanow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of authority
.... a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does not."
Id. at 1550.
138 Id. at 1551; see also Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[A]
seizure requires not only that the reasonable person feel that he is not free to leave, but
also that the subject actually yield to a show of authority from the police or be physically
touched by the police.").
9 Hoda, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1551.
'40 111 S. Ct. at 1551.
See Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause,
Imperceptible Plain Yiew, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 . CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1222 (1983) (referring to the nine search and seizure cases decided
by the Court during October of 1982, the author stated that 'it is almost as if a majority
of the Court was hell-bent to seize any available opportunity to define more expansively
the constitutional authority of law enforcement officials.").
4 See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
'4' See supra text accompanying notes 113-22.
144 Considerable precedent had established the Court's refusal to inquire into a police
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of the police officer's intent to capture by particular means. Whether
applying conservative or liberal ideology, the Court has erred in
excluding attempted and accidental seizures from Fourth Amendment
coverage.
I1. ACCIDENTAL SEIzuRES
Applying the Katz approach to Fourth Amendment coverage to
accidental seizures of a person would require that the Court identify the
extent to which citizens legitimately expect that they will not be exposed
to accidental injury at the hands of the police. 5 The average citizen
would likely agree with the Court's recognition that police are not perfect,
and that "room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men ... ."' The average citizen,
however, might be surprised to learn that the police no longer need to act
reasonably when they lack the intent to harm a particular citizen in a
particular way, because, in such a case, the citizen is not seized under the
Fourth Amendment. For example, the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable
when the police shoot an innocent bystander, so long as the shot was
intended to stop a criminal suspect.'4 7
A. Brower v. County of Inyo and Objective vs. Subjective Intent
The Brower v. County of Inyo'" Court insisted that the Fourth
Amendment does not encompass "the accidental effects of otherwise
lawful government conduct."149
It is clear ... that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur
whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individu-
al's freedom of movement (the innocent passerby), nor even whenever
there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired termina-
officer's subjective intent and its insistence that searches and seizures must be evaluated
fiom an objective perspective. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)
(holding that subjective motivations of the individual officers have no bearing on whether
a particular seizure is unreasonable).
141 See S5Upra text accompanying note 35.
146 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949), cited with approval in llinois
v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990).
'47 Rucker v. Harford County, Md., 946 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1175 (1992).
14 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
'
49 Id. at 596.
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tion of an individual's freedom of movement (the fleeing felon), but
only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement
through means intentionally applied."
The difficulty of translating this cumbersome language into a constitutional
principle is exacerbated by the Courts failure to define the type of intent
required for a seizure.
In common usage, the word "intention!' "simply indicates what one
proposes to do or accomplish.'.' In keeping with this meaning, the
majority opinion in Brower contains a number of terms that connote a
subjective state of mind: "willful" detention; results which are "desired,"
"sought," and "meant"; "designed" and "selected" means." Having
authored an opinion replete with allusions to the police officer's subjective
state of mind, Justice Scalia then proclaimed that he did not think it
"practicable" to inquire into subjective intent." The concurring Justices
commended their colleague for avoiding inquiries into subjective intent,
although they questioned his introduction of the "concept of objective intent"
as a standard for determining Fourth Amendment seizures."
It is not clear that Justice Scalia was formulating a concept of objective
intent in Brower because he neither employed the term in his majority
opinion, nor did he contest or endorse the concurring opiniont use of the
term.155 If objective intent is in fact the new litmus test for Fourth Amend-
ment seizures, this author is unable to locate any clarification of the term
itself" or any prior discussion by the Court of what role objective intent
plays in defining Fourth Amendment seizures. "The reported cases all seem
to look to subjective intent. However, the distinction between subjective and
objective intent was not in issue in any of those cases.' ' 2
IO Id. at 596-97.
.. WEBSTIW'S TRD NEW INTmNATIONAL DICIONARY 1176 (Unabridged ed. 1986)
[hereinafter WEBsTER's].
' Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-99.
"3 Id. at 598.
14 Id. at 600 (Stevens, J., concurring).
5 Id. at 594-600 .(majority opinion).
15 See Thomas Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After
Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 799, 841 (1991) ("Brower demonstrates
that the intent to seize is measured objectively but does not specify how that is to be
done."). It may be that Justice Scalia is still in the early stages of formulating a more
explicit concept of obojective intent. During oral arguments in Hodari, the Justice "asked
counsel what he thought the words 'intentional acquis'ion of control' in (Brower) meant."
Arguments Heard- California v. Hodari D., 48 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3131 (Feb. 6,1991).
15 Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
[Vol. 82
RiGHT TO BE SECURE
Objective intent can best be analogized to the required intent in pretext
arrest cases. In these cases, lower courts have focused upon objective facts in
establishing probable cause for the arrest, as distinguished from those
subjective factors which actually prompted the individual officer to seize the
suspect." A clear distinction exists between objective facts upon which a
reasonably prudent officer might have acted (a hypothetical construct) and
subjective factors which in reality motivated an individual officer. This
distinction between subjective and objective intent, however, is more difficult
to comprehend in light of the general understanding that the term "intent'
betokens an existing state of mind rather than a hypothetical construct 59
The ambiguities in the Brower opinion suggest at least three plausible
readings ofJustice Scalias allusions to intent. First, despite his disclaimer, the
Justice is in fact addressing subjective intent as a requirement for Fourth
Amendment seizures." Second, the Justice is formulating a requirement
for subjective intent, but is suggesting that the "practicable" way to proceed
is to examine the objective circumstances from which subjective intent may
be inferred. Third, in place of an inquiry into subjective intent, the Justice is
requiring that the Court examine the objective circumstances in order to
determine whether a reasonably prudent officer would have realized that his
action would result in a seizure."'
B. "Intentional Means" vs. "Intended Results" and Historical Origins
In addition to leaving unresolved the issue of the correct definition and
application of objective intent, the Court in Brower creates another puzzle in
its attempt to formulate a constitutional distinction between an intended result
and the intended means of achieving that result. The following hypothetical
a' See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986) ("the proper
inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of
illegitimate motivation"). See generally John Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now
You See It, Now You Don't, 17 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 523 (1984) (analyzing application of
the objective standard to pretextual search and seizure cases); James Haddad, Pretextual
Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 639 (1985)
(discussing treatment of pretext cases by the United States Supreme Court).
119 WEBSTEW'S, suqra note 151, at 1176.
See Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1989) (a post-
Brower case omitting any discussion of objective intent and holding that no seizure took
place because the officer did not intend for his pursuit of the suspect to end by reason of
the suspect's collision with an on-coming car).
" In the absence of clear guidance as to which of these possible definitions is
appropriate, the remainder of this Article addresses both a subjective intent to seize and
a reasonably prudent officer's perception of whether a seizure has taken place.
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illustrates the problems that the Court's use of the concepts of "intentional
means" and "intended results" creates. 62 Assume that the pursuing
officer in Brower did not order a roadblock, but instead intended to
continue the chase until his show of authority convinced the suspect to
stop voluntarily. Assume further that in the course of the chase, the
officer rounded a blind curve and crashed into the suspect's vehicle,
which had stopped due to mechanical failure.
The hypothetical poses the question of whether the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to a result which was not achieved in the precise manner
that the government agent intended. Brower appears to exclude this type
of situation from Fourth Amendment coverage because of the absence of
a perfect match between the intended means and the actual means of
terminating the suspect's freedom of movement." Had the suspect
stopped his car because of the intimidation created by the chase, the
intended means and the actual means of apprehension would have
coincided and, based on the Court's interpretation of previous chase cases,
a seizure would have occurred.'" Similarly, had the police meant to
collide with the suspect's vehicle, a seizure would have occurred because
there would again be a perfect match between intent and result. 65 Under
" See supra text accompanying note 150.
163 In a broad sense, the police set an instrunentality (the police car) into motion for
the purpose of stopping the suspect. But, in a narrow sense, the police car was intended
to intimidate the suspect, not to run him over. As the Brower Court noted, "'In marked
contrast to a police car pursuing with flashing lights, ... a roadblock is not just a
significant show of authority to induce a voluntary stop, but is designed to produce a stop
by physical impact if voluntary compliance does not occur." Brower, 489 U.S. at 598.
An additional example is Justice Scalia's hypothetical involving a serial murderer
running away from two pursuing constables. The suspect is apprehended when "a parked
and unoccupied police car slips its brake and pins [the fleeing suspect] against a wall."
Id. at 596. Justice Scalia maintained that this unintended method of terminating the
suspect's freedom of movement would not constitute a seizure. Id. Therefore, the result
would be the same in the ' mechanical failure" hypothetical, as well
'A See id. at 597. The Brower Court also discussed Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57 (1924), which involved a revenue agent's pursuit of suspects in possession of
moonshine whiskey. During their flight, the suspects dropped the containers, which the
agent recovered. A unanimous Court in Hester held that "there was no seizure in the
sense of the law when the officers examined the contents of each [container] after it had
been abandoned." Id. at 58. The Brower Court suggested that the result in Hester "would
have been quite different, of course, if the revenue agent had shouted 'Stop and give us
those bottles, in the name of the law."Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. According to the Brower
Court, "[then the taking of possession would have been not merely the result of
government action but the result of the very means (the show of authority) that the
government selected, and a Fourth Amendment seizure would have occurred." Id at 597-
98.
165 See Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 (if a police vehicle "had pulled alongside the fleeing
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the facts of the hypothetical above, however, the offlcer physical collision
with the suspect is contrary to the officer's intent to intimidate the suspect into
stopping voluntarily. Thus, according to Brower, no seizure has occured
because the intended means did not match the actual means of terminating the
suspect' freedom of movement.'"
As justification for its novel treatment of intentional means and accidental
seizures," the Brower Court opined that the Fourth Amendment encom-
passes a willful "detention or taking' and a "misuse of power," but "not the
accidental effects of otherwise lawful conduct. '""s Once again, however, the
Court neglected to define its terminology. The term "williul detention!' could
possibly encompass any detention resulting from a volitional act (for example,
a willed bodily movement); 69 however, this mundane requirement of
volitional conduct adds nothing new to the amendment' jurisprudence and
says nothing at all about the accidental or intentional results of deliberate
conduct by a government official.'7 After all, the hypothetical posits a
car and sideswiped it, producing the crash, then the termination of the suspect's freedom
of movement would have been a seizure").
'" The Court observed that the officers in Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir.
1986); supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text, "sought to stop the suspect only by
the show of authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit[]" whereas
the suspect was actually "stopped by a different means-his loss of control of his vehicle
and the subsequent crash." Brower, 489 U.S. at 597.
6 
4 Prior to Brower, the Court considered a form of unintended search and seizure
under the rubric of inadvertent plain view. A plurality of the Court in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446 (1971), suggested that an anticipated (i.e., intended) plain
view seizure may taint otherwise lawful actions by the police. However, in promulgating
a constitutionally significant link between intended seizures and otherwise lawful conduct,
Coolidge did not address the reverse question of whether there is a similarly significant
relationship between unintended seizures and otherwise unlawful conduct. The full
ramifications of the plain view doctrine's 'Inadvertence" requirement were never
addressed by the Supreme Court and the inadvertence requirement was later abandoned
in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 13842 (1990).
' Brower, 489 U.S. at 596.
There is general agreement that an act should be defined as a movement of a part
of the body. See OuIVm W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54 (Boston, Little, Brown and
Company 1938) (1881) ("[An act] is a muscular contraction, and something more:");
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(2) (1962) ("bodily movement whether voluntary or
involuntary"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 (1965) ('The word 'act' is used
... to denote an external manifestation of the actor's will and does not include any of its
results, even the most direct, immediate, and intended.").
'raThe amendment restricts only those searches and seizures conducted by
government officials. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614
(1989) ("[The Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary
one, effected by a private party on his own initiative...."); see also Walter v. United
States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) ("a wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private
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detention resulting from the officer's volitional conduct in chasing the
suspect'
7
'
More than volitional conduct is at issue if the terms "willful
detention," "misuse of power," or "otherwise lawful conduct" are
construed to require that the officer or a reasonably prudent officer be
aware that he is unlawfully intruding upon the suspect's liberty inter-
ests. 7 - It is unlikely that such a construction is the Court's intent for
such an interpretation merely reduces the Fourth Amendment to a
prohibition of calculated efforts to violate the Constitution. While United
States v. Leon" created a good faith exception to the amendment's
exclusionary rule,74 the scope of the amendment has never been
contingent upon an officer's good or bad intentions. 75
The Brower Court's attempt to distinguish accidental seizures from willful
detentions is further flawed by the Court's declaration that the amendment
does not address the "accidental effects of otherwise lawful conduct."'76
This assertion is either a mere tautology or a slight of hand machination
which assumes away the very issue under consideration. When there is no
"umlawful" intrusion upon privacy or liberty, there is no constitutional
violation which can contaminate the physical seizure of citizens or their
property. Once a court determines that police conduct is constitutionally
lawful, it is constitutionally irrelevant whether the effects of that conduct are
accidental or intentional.'
party does not violate the Fourth Amendmenj; Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467
(1921) ("the Fourth Amendment protects only'against searches and seizures which are
made under governmental authority"), overnded on other grounds by Bltins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
171 The detention also results from the suspect's volitional conduct in seeking to avoid
apprehension. The allocation of responsibility between the police and the suspect, both
of whom played an active role in bringing about the seizure, is discussed in Bacigal,
supra note 80, at 100.
17 See supra text accompanying note 168.
1 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
'74 Id. at 926.
17' See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) ("An officer's evil intentions will
not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force;
nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force
constitutional."); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985) (holding that the
seizure was unreasonable despite the officer's reliance upon legal precedents and his good
faith belief in the legality of using deadly force).
176 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (emphasis added).
177 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990) (Eliminating the inadvertence
requirement from the plain view doctrine, the court stated that '!no additional Fourth
Amendment interest is furthered by requiring that the discovery of evidence be
[Vol. 82
RIGHT TO BE SECURE
The Brower Court's reference to lawful conduct fails to distinguish
between police conduct which is constitutionally lawful because there has
been no intrusion upon a privacy or liberty interest (the Fourth Amend-
ment's threshold question) and conduct which is lawful because the
intrusion is reasonable (the Fourth Amendment's substantive question). If
the latter situation applied in Brower, then the Court bypassed the
threshold question of the amendment's scope by proceeding directly to an
analysis of the reasonableness of the government's conduct. 78 If the
former situation applied, Brower failed to define a seizure independent of
the ultimate question of the seizure's lawfulness or reasonableness. By
merging the amendment's threshold and substantive questions in an
obscure allusion to "otherwise lawful government conduct,"'79 the Court
fails to explain why the scope of the Fourth Amendment does not extend
to situations where a police officer's conduct, whether ultimately
reasonable or unreasonable, results in an accidental intrusion upon the
suspect's freedom of movement.
The only justification offered by the Court for excluding accidental
seizures from Fourth Amendment coverage was the historically accurate
observation that "[tlhe writs of assistance that were the principle
grievance against which the Fourth Amendment was directed... did not
involve unintended consequences of government action."'" The Court's
reading of history, however, does not resolve the issue of accidental
seizures. While condemning the intentional seizures associated with writs
of assistance, the constitutional framers were never called upon to
consider the question of accidental seizures. Given the climate of hostility
surrounding writs of assistance and general warrants, it is doubtful that
inadvertent.").
"n Oral arguments in Brower demonstrate the Court's tendency to blur the existence
of a seizure with the reasonableness of that seizure. During presentation of the plaintiff's
argunent, counsel made it clear that he preferred not to explore the ultimate reasonable-
ness of the seizure. Arguments Heard Brower v. County of Inyo, 44 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 4149 (Feb. 1, 1989). However,
[pleppered with questions about this issue from the very beginning of his
presentation, counsel was at pains to assure the justices [sic] that the question
was not before them at this time and a reversal of the lower court's decision
would mean only that the reasonableness of the seizure could finally be put to
the test.
Id. at 4149. When the Justices continued to raise questions about the reasonableness of
the seizure, counsel pleaded. "All we want,.. .is for you to say that there was a seizure
here so that we can explore the question of reasonableness.' Id. at 4150.
17 Brower, 489 U.S. at 596.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the framers would endorse the Court's view that no seizure took place in
Galas'8' when the suspect crashed while trying to avoid the police.
One of the most "odious features of writs of assistance [was] the
unbridled discretion given public officials to choose targets of the search-
es."22 Our founding fathers sought protection against the arbitrary
exercise of governmental power as well as protection against intentional
misconduct by government officials. 3 Either intentional or arbitrary
misconduct may result in harm to citizens and, although the link between
creation of risk and realization of harm is often fortuitous, the govern-
ment's freedom to engage in certain conduct is initially restricted in order
to avoid potential harm to citizens. When the framers of the Fourth
Amendment guaranteed "the right of the people to be secure ... against
unreasonable searches and seizures,"' they were not equating the
reasonableness of police pursuit with the absence of malicious intent.s
It is fallacious to impute to the framers a desire to confine the Fourth
Amendment to a prohibition of only the most egregious abuses associated
with eighteenth century writs of assistance. In light of the Court's
acknowledgement that it "has not simply frozen into constitutional law
those law enforcement practices that existed at the time of the Fourth
'8' See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. If the facts of Galas could have been
considered at the time of the writs of assistance controversy, they may have been as
follows. A customs inspector directs a royal frigate to stop and board a colonial merchant
vessel In response to the chase, the merchant vessel flees into shallow waters where it
crashes on a reef, causing the demise of the crew. Would the founding fathers have been
content to ignore the incident because the customs inspector meant no physical harm to
the merchant. Or would they have demanded to know the customs inspector's justification
for initiating the pursuit of the merchant?
"8I Shirley Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of
Governmental Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1483, 1487 (1979).
11 See Lewis Katz, Reflections on Search and Seizure and Illegally Seized Evidence
in Canada and the United &tates, 3 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 103, 109-14 (1980) (the Fourth
Amendment proscribed the broad intrusions associated with general warrants and writs
of assistance and replaced them with limited intrusions based upon probable cause, the
warrant requirements, and an overall requirement of reasonableness); see also Arnold
Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1229, 1236 (1983) ("Virtually every significant prerevolutionary search or seizure
involved a nonspecific or arbitrarily obtained warrant.").
184 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
185 E.g., Ilinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990) ("It is apparent that in
order to satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is
generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by
agents of the government ... is not that they always be correct, but that they always be
reasonable.").
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Amendment's passage,""18 the Court must look beyond specific histori-
cal practices in order to discern the broader purposes underlying the
creation of the amendment.
C. The Brower Connection Between Governmental Action and Loss
of Liberty
According to Katz v. United States"7 and Terry v. Ohio,"8 the
fundamental purposes of the amendment are reflected in the twin
predicates that trigger its application-(1) intrusions upon privacy or
liberty interests that are (2) brought about by governmental action.'"
Both predicates are met when our hypothetical police officer unintention-
ally crashes into the suspect's vehicle, thereby bringing about a conver-
gence of government action and a resulting intrusion upon the citizen's
liberty interests. The Brower court surpassed the principles of Katz and
Terry when it suggested that the concurrence of these twin predicates
does not constitute a seizure unless the two predicates are linked by an
intent to bring about the intrusion "through means intentionally ap-
plied."'"' While the Court undoubtedly assumed in Katz and Terry that
the predicates must be linked in some fashion, the Court never addressed
the nature of that union. Brower is the first Supreme Court case to focus
upon the causal connection between governmental action and loss of
liberty, and the first case to suggest that the government agent's intent is
the vital connection between the two."'
The absence of clear precedent" for the holding in Brower invites
speculation as to what prompted the Court to create a requirement that
seizures be brought about "through means intentionally applied.'
193
" Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980); see also Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ('Time worcs changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. . . . In the application of a constitution,
therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.").
"7389 U.S. 347 (1967).
1 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1,8 See Amsterdam, supra note 36, at 382-84.
Brower, 489 U.S. at 597.
'9' Iad at 596-97.
L' See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (holding that the Due Process
Clause is not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or
injury to life, hberty, or property). Brower, however, addressed the unintended means of
bringing about an intended loss of liberty. Brower, 489 U.S. at 59"-
88 Brower, 489 U.S. at 597.
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Perhaps the Brower Court balked at the prospect of extending the Fourth
Amendment to accidental seizures and potentially further punishing the
constable for well-intentioned blunders. On the other hand, if the Court's
hostility to the exclusionary rule 9 or its reluctance to extend 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to encompass mere negligence19 influenced its decision in Brower,
then the Court has lost sight of its limited role of defining the threshold
requirements for a seizure. Merely acknowledging that the threshold may be
crossed by accidental intrusions upon liberty does not commit the Court to
punishing the police for accidents. The coverage of the amendment is only
the preliminary inquiry, while the reasonableness of the officer's conduct the
application of the exclusionary rule, and compensation under § 1983 remain
separate issues for the Court to address.6
I for example, our hypothetical police officer's crash into the suspect
vehicle were classified as a seizure, the reasonableness of that seizure would
hinge upon striking the appropriate balance between the justification for the
chase and the potential threat that the chase poses to the suspect's liberty."s
In the event that the balance is struck in favor of the governmental interest
underlying the officer pursuit the Court could sanction the reasonableness
of his actions. The Court should do so, however, by issuing a limited ruling
that condones only this particular specimen of accidental seizure. A decision
on the substantive reasonableness of a specific form of accidental seizure is
fundamentally distinct from Brower's universal dictate that the Fourth
Amendment never encompasses the unintended consequences of government
action. ApplyingBrowers inflexible constitutional dogma to our hypothetical
results in the startling conclusion that because the officer did not intend to
stop the suspect by the resulting method, no seizure of a person occurred,
- See infra note 264 and accompanying text. Although the exclusionary rule is not
germane in § 1983 cases such as Brower, the constitutional definition of a seizure is
applicable to both § 1983 cases and to criminal prosecutions. See Brower, 489 U.S. at
595-97 (citing both a criminal case, Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), and a
§ 1983 case, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), to support a generic definition of
accidental seizures). Since this seizure definition applies to criminal prosecutions, the
definition affects the operation of the exclusionary rule. See Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (citing Brower's definition of a seizure within
the context of sobriety checkpoints).
See infra note 211.
A determination of seizure involves the Court in second-tier issues, such as
reasonableness. For example, see Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th
Cir. 1989), and Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't,721 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D. Ark. 1989),
where both courts assumed that a seizure took place and upheld the reasonableness of the
seizure.
"7 See supra note 196.
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even though the officer ran over and killed the very suspect whom the
officer was pursuing.
The Court can avoid such nonsensical results by discarding the
Brower majority's categorical rejection of accidental seizures in favor of
the concurring opinion's recognition that "[t]he intentional acquisition of
physical control of something is no doubt a characteristic of the typical
seizure, but [it is not clear] that it is an essential element of every seizure
or that this formulation is particularly helpful in deciding close cas-
es."' The concurring Justices refused to join the majority in elevating
a characteristic of a typical seizure to the level of a constitutional
prerequisite for application of the Fourth Amendment.'" Unlike the
majority opinion, the concurring opinion holds open the possibility of
extending the amendment to the atypical accidental seizure whenever
necessary to achieve the primary goals of the amendment."°°
Consider the differing results when the respective approaches of
Brower's majority and concurring opinions are applied to our hypotheti-
cal, with one last fact added to the situation. Assume that the police
officer initiated the chase of the suspect because the officer did not
approve of a political bumper sticker on the suspect's vehicle. According
to the Brower majority, if the officer had intended to run over the
suspect, a seizure would occur and Tennessee v. Garner would
require the Court to balance the intentional use of deadly force against
the justification for using the force. °2 Under the facts of this hypotheti-
cal, however, the officer intended to chase the suspect but did not intend
to run over her. Thus, the resulting accidental use of deadly force
remains beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment and beyond the
scope of judicial review.!0 3 The Brower majority would refuse to
'"Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 600 (1989) (Stevens, ., concuning).
19 Id. at 600-01.
Id. Accidental seizures may be atypical, but they are not rare. Numerous accidental
injuries arise from the countless incidents in which the state and its citizens interact. See,
e.g., Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1990) (bullet intended for
fleeing suspect struck the suspect's hostage); Roach, 882 F.2d at 294 (police pursuit of
fleeing felon caused the felon to collide with an innocent citizen's vehicle); Fernandez v.
Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209 (lst Cir. 1986) (shooting of a kidnap victim during pursuit of
kidnappers); Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985) (officers mistook
innocent victim for a fugitive and killed him); Britt, 721 F. Supp. at 189 (citizen killed
in car crash following a police officer's pursuit of a car thief).
20' 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Brower, 489 U.S. at 597.
Absent a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court may not invoke its
supervisory powers to exclude evidence obtained by offensive police conduct. United
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entertain allegations of a blatantly unjustified exercise of deadly force so
long as the officer "didn't mean" to hurt anyone. By attaching so much
significance to intent, the Brower majority ignored the maxim, "Though
boys throw stones at frogs in jest, the frogs die in earnest." Regardless of
the officer's intent, the injury caused to the suspect is within the risks that
the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable seizures seeks to avoid,
and thus within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Applying the Katz
terminology, 4 "the interest in freedom from bodily harm surely
qualifies as an interest in liberty 2 and undoubtedly qualifies as a
legitimate expectation of the citizenry.
In contrast to the Brower majority's view of intentional seizures, the
concurring opinion suggests that an examination of the officer's intent
"adds little to the well-established rule that 'aperson has been "seized"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave."' 2s In our hypothetical situation,
it is obvious that a person who has been run over by a police cruiser
would reasonably perceive that his freedom of movement has been
constrained. Having crossed this threshold requirement for the establish-
ment of a seizure, the concurring opinion would examine the substantive
reasonableness of the seizure by balancing the suspect's loss of liberty
(death) against the underlying justification for the chase (the officer's
disdain for the bumper sticker). The Brower majority's refusal to examine
the underlying justification for police pursuit sanctions what the Court in
Terry v. Ohio condemned-the government's attempts "to isolate from
constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the
policeman and the citizen.""2 7
Exempting law enforcement officials from any requirement to justify
pursuit culminating in an accidental seizure impedes the Fourth Amend-
ment's twin goals of avoiding certain harms to citizens..5 and of
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 733 (1980). "All claims that law enforcement officers
have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or
other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process' approach." Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 341 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Brower, 489 U.S. at 600 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)).
207 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
It is inevitable that police response to violent crime will at times create some risk
of injury to suspects and innocent bystanders. The reasonableness of creating such risks
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regulating police misconduct!' The judiciary can be faithful to these
goals and can exercise meaningful review of police pursuit by insisting
that the police offer the type of substantive justification that the amend-
ment requires: that the chase was prompted by probable cause, reasonable
suspicion, or the like!" The existence or absence of a constitutionally
appropriate justification for police pursuit can be brought to light only if
the Court brings accidental seizures and the underlying police conduct
within the coverage of the amendment"
depends upon the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't,
721 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (holding that it is reasonable for an officer to
turn on flashing lights and a siren in an attempt to induce the suspect to stop and that it
is reasonable for an officer to follow a fleeing car for a short distance in light traffic to
see if the suspect would desist from flight; noting, however, that at some point continued
pursuit at high speeds in heavy traffic might become unreasonable). But see Carter v.
Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
"creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to affect a legal arrest of a
suspect .... [Iln Brower, for instance, the question on remand was whether it was
reasonable to seize a fleeing suspect with a deadman roadblock, not whether it was
reasonable to pursue the suspect in a high-speed car chase.").
- See Teny, 392 U.S. at 15 ("Courts still retain their traditional responsibility to
guard against police [misconduct that] ... trenches upon personal security without the
objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires.").
'I "Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their
duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part.
But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions ofprobability." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); see
also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
requires not that police always be in concert but "that they always be reasonable").
2 This author does not suggest that the Fourth Amendment applies to all improper
police conduct causing physical harm to a citizen. "[I]t is perfectly clear that not every
injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable under" § 1983. Martinez
v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980). For example, a state law tort suit, not federal
civil rights litigation, would be the appropriate vehicle for compensation of a citizen
accidentally rnm over by a police car on a frolic to the doughnut shop. See Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976) (holding that § 1983 does not create a cause of action for
survivors of an innocent bystander negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government
vehicle); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (finding that negligent
acts by government officials, though causing loss of liberty, are not actionable under the
Due Process Clause).
What is suggested is that when the police engage in volitional conduct for the very
purpose of apprehending a suspect, it is irrelevant that the conduct succeeds in
apprehending the suspect in some unintended or unforeseen mamer. See Landol-Rivera
v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is intervention directed at a
specific individual that furnishes the basis for a Fourth Amendment claim.").
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IV. ATrEMPTED SEIzURES
In the case of accidental seizures, the citizen's loss of liberty is unmistak-
able, but the police officer lacks an "objective intent '" '2 to seize the citizen
through particular means. The situation is reversed with attempted seizures,
in which the officer's intent to seize is clear, but the point at which the citizen
actually loses liberty is more nebulous.
What Brower v. County of Inyo2" achieved in the area of accidental
seizures, California v. Hodari D.2 4 accomplished for attempted seizures.
Both cases discarded Katz v. United States2 5 and Teny v. Ohio"6 by
eschewing any endeavor to reconcile the fimdamental clash between personal
liberty and collective security created by encounters between police and
citizen. Application of the Katz analysis of the amendment1 scope"7 to
attempted seizures of a person would have required the Court to identify the
legitimate expectations of liberty that a citizen holds when traversing the
streets and highways of America. For instance, does a pedestrian expect that
a police officer will attempt to tackle him to the ground; that police bullets
will fly past his head, that an officer may single out a citizen and demand
identification papers and an explanation of why the individual is in the area?
Do American citizens expect that all of this may occur in the absence of any
indication that they are engaged in criminal activity? Katz and Teny posed
these types of questions as "the central inquiry under the Fourth Amend-
ment-the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmen-
tal invasion of a citizen's personal security."2 "8
In Hodari, Justice Stevens pointed out that the central inquiry of the
Court in Katz and Teny had expanded the constitutional definition of a
seizure beyond common law concepts?19 The Hodari majority, however,
insisted that Justice Stevens had failed to grasp the distinction between
seizures of property and seizures of a person. The majority explained:
212 See supra text accompanying note 150.
2" 489 U.S. 493 (1989).
24 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
" 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
216 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27 See supra notes 30.49 and accompanying text.
" Teny, 392 U.S. at 19.
"Significantly, in the Katz opinion, the Court repeatedly used the word 'seizure' to
describe the process of recording sounds that could not possibly have been the subject of
a common-law seizure." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1555
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Terry Court "concluded that the word 'seizure'
in the Fourth Amendment encompasses official restraints on individual freedom that fall
short of a common-law arrest." Id.
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The dissent is correct that Katzv. United States ... "unequivocally reject[s]
the notion that the common law of arrest defines the limits of the term
'seizure'in the Fourth Amendment" .... But we do not assert that it defines
the limits of the term "seizure"; only that it defines the limits of a seizure
ofthe person. What Katz stands for is the proposition that items which could
not be subject to seizure at common law (e.g., telephone conversations) can
be seized under the Fourth Amendment. That is quite different from saying
that what constitutes an arrest (a seizure of the person) has changed. 2
The above quote, contained within a footnote, sets forth but fails to
explain the nature ofthis fundamental distinction between seizures ofproperty
and seizures of a person. The essence of Katz is its recognition that the
amendment "protects people," not places or things."2 Thus, the amendment
protects items not subject to seizure at common law because they may qualify
as extensions of the person protected privacy interests?' It is difficult to
comprehend how the Court can maintain that the amendment protects
extensions of the person (e.g., conversations) against incorporeal intrusions
(e.g., eavesdropping), but does not protect the person himself against such
intrusions. If physical trespass is no longer the essence of Fourth Amendment
seizures of property, why would physical restraint be regarded as the
benchmark for defining seizures of the person? Once the Court recognizes
that governmental action Mailing short of physical trespass can threaten privacy
interests in personal items, it would seem axiomatic that governmental action
faling short of physical restraint can threaten personal liberty interests.?
Unable to dissuade the majority from its insistence that the common law
requirement of corporal restraint "defines the limits of a seizure of the
person, 4 Justice Stevens pointed out that the Tactual situation in Hodari
involved "an unlawful attempt to take a presumptively innocent person into
custody.M5 Thus, the Court was urged to look "not to the common law of
111 S. Ct. at 1551 n.3 (quoting the dissenting opinion at 1556) (citations omitted).
v' Kaz, 389 U.S. at 351.
See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980) (refusing to extend Fourth
Amendment protections on the basis of the defendant's possessory interest in the item).
But see Soldal v. Cook County, MI1., 113 S. Ct. 538, 543-45 (1992) (explaining that the
Fourth Amendment protects property interests as well as privacy interests); Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion) ("[The amendment] protects
people and their effects, and it protects those effects whether they are 'personal' or
'impersonal."), overruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
' See sutra text accompanying note 218.
2' Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1551 n.3.
22 111 S. Ct. at 1553 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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arrest, but to the common law of attempted arrest '  Although at
common law an accomplished arrest required "either touching or submis-
sion,"' the common law also recognized that "an officer might be
guilty of an assault because of an attempted arrest, without privilege, even
if he did not succeed in touching the other." The Hodari majority,
however, asserted that "neither usage nor common-law tradition makes an
attempted seizure a seizure. The common-law may have made an
attempted seizure unlawful in certain circumstances; but it made many
things unlawful, very few of which were elevated to constitutional
proscriptions." 9
The majority did not or could not explain why it had selectively
incorporated common law arrests into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
while refusing to assimilate common law concepts of attempted arrests.
Recognition of a common law arrest as "the quintessential 'seizure of the
person' under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence" does not mean
that the Court must banish common law prohibitions of attempted arrests
to the trash bin of peculiar historical practices that cannot be "elevated to
constitutional proscriptions. ''r After all, while intrusion into residential
dwellings is the prototypical search specified in the Constitution, the
Court since Katz has extended Fourth Amendment coverage to commer-
cial premises,23 automobiles' and quasi-public areas& 5
Justice Stevens' two-pronged effort to place attempted seizures within
the coverage of the Fourth Amendment was frustrated by the majority's
facility for using each prong to trump the other. Common law concepts
of attempted arrests could not control constitutional interpretation; yet, at
the same time, the common law concept of completed arrests prevented
an expansive reading of the amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
22 Id. at 1554.
Rollin M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201, 206 (1940).
eId at 201 n.3 (citing Gold v. Bissell, 1 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1828)).
Ho!ari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1550 n.2.
230 111 S. Ct. at 1550.
231 Id at 1550 n.2; see, e.g., State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 1310 (Conn. 1992)
('T'he distinction between an arrest and an attempted arrest at common law reflected the
difference between battery and assault .... [W]e are persuaded that the dichotomy
between an attempted arrest and an arrest 'should not take on constitutional dimensions.")
(citation omitted).
23' See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980).
233 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
2m See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985).
235 Katz extended Fourth Amendment protection to a public telephone booth "whose
momentary occupants" had a right to expect "freedom from intrusion." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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seizuresY The majority's inconsistent reliance on common law prece-
dents stifled meaningful debate on the important issue that Hodari and
the other chase cases raised: does the Fourth Amendment encompass all
attempted seizures, no attempted seizures, or only certain types of
attempted seizures? Common sense dictates that it is an unnatural
limitation of Fourth Amendment coverage to exempt all attempted
seizures, even those attempts which involve firing weapons at fleeing
suspects. 7 Pragmatism also precludes the opposite extreme of extend-
ing the amendment to every governmental effort to regulate a citizen's
movements. The Court must find the appropriate middle ground
between overinclusive and underinclusive coverage by drawing a line of
demarcation that identifies which forms of attempted seizures are covered
by the Fourth AmendmentO9
The principal flaw in the Hodari Court's categorical rejection of
attempted seizures lies in its suggestion that, in the past two hundred
years, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not progressed beyond
common law concepts of arrest.' 0 Although history plays an important
' In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1677 (1991), Justice
Scalia stated that the Fourth Amendment "should not become less than" the common law
while, in Hodari, the Justice asserts that the amendment can never mean more than the
common law. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, ll S. Ct. 1547, 1550-51
(1991).
2'7 "In its decision, the Court assumes, without acknowledging, that a police officer
may now fire his weapon at an innocent citizen and not implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment-as long as he misses his target." Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1552 (Stevens,
I., dissenting); see also Palmer v. Williamson, 717 F. Supp. 1218, 1223 (W.D. Tex. 1989)
(holding that although the police fired at and struck the suspect's vehicle, no seizure
occured because the suspect failed to stop). But see Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428,
1432 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that an issue of material fact existed as to whether a
seizure occured under the Fourth Amendment when the officer's bullet struck the vehicle,
causing it to stop).
"' Otherwise, the amendment must be applied to every policeman who directs the
flow of traffic. See, e.g., Carson v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 415, 416 (Va. 1992)
(Hassell, J., dissenting) (stating that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a police
officer approaches a vehicle required to stop at a toll booth). See infra note 338; see also
People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567-68 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that the spirit underlying
the Fourth Amendment requires the adoption of methods to protect the individual from
arbitrary or intimidating police conduct).
2" See infra text accompanying note 348.
A As the Court itself has stated.
The common-law rules governing searches and arrests evolved in a society far
simpler than ours is today. Crime has changed, as have the means of law
enforcement, and it would therefore be naive to assume that those actions a
constable could take in an English or American village three centuries ago
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role in shaping the amendment, only a shallow view of constitutional law
would maintain that the amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures
of the person has no higher purposes, discernible values, aims or
applications beyond that of common law arrests."' By focusing upon
the common law concepts of physical touching or constraint of the
suspect's physical movement, Hodari reduces the Fourth Amendment
rights of liberty and personal security to a narrow right of physical
locomotion.2 The Court has thoughtlessly discarded both the uniquely
American concept of a "right to be let alone" 43 and its implication that
the Fourth Amendment encompasses all significant forms of police
encounters with citizens.' Hodari's invocation of common law prece-
dent reveals just how out-of-touch the Court is with modem-day
encounters between police and citizens. That "[a] ship still fleeing, even
though under attack, would not be considered to have been seized as a
war prize"" says very little about the need to extend Fourth Amend-
ment protections to citizens fleeing from (that is, seeking to avoid contact
with) the police.
In a nation where the right to be let alone is a cherished value, the
spirit, if not the specific language, of the Fourth Amendment compels the
should necessarily govern what we, as a society, now regard as proper.
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981).
24 Justice Scalia later characterized Hodar" as establishing that "the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of 'unreasonable seizures,' insofar as it applies to seizure of the
person, preserves for our citizens the traditional protections against unlawful arrest
afforded by the common law." County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1672
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). By focusing on common law arrests, Hodari ignores the
important role that the amendment plays in shaping the individual's relationship with
government. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
242 See Macun, supra note 44, at 1264-66.
1 The framers of our Constitution "conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-4he most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
right to be let alone is "too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the
detection of crime." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); see also
EDWARD S. CORWIN, LiBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT at xiii (1948) ("the oldest theme
which underlies the history of American constitutional law, that of Liberty Against
Government'); Arthur L. Goodhart, The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U.
PA. L. REV. 943 (1958) (outlining the conflict between government dictating law and
government submitting to the law).
44 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (stating that absent evidence of
criminality, the Fourth Amendment provides that a citizen's interest in "personal security
and privacy" mandates "freedom from police interference").
' California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991) (citation
omitted).
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Court to articulate constitutional standards which protect the individual
from arbitrary or intimidating police conduct falling short of physical
control over the individual Unlike common law arrests, there can be no
single predicate for defining constitutional seizures of the person, and
neither physical touching nor surrender of physical movement should be
necessary prerequisites for triggering Fourth Amendment coverage. The
Court must supplement its preoccupation with physical restraint with a
broader consideration of (1) the existence of incorporeal, but meaningful,
infringements upon a citizen's liberty, and (2) the citizen's acquies-
cence to such infringements.247
A. Physical Restraints
Hodari's conclusion that no seizure occurs without physical touching
or submission to authority is superficially appealing; it makes the
constitutional criteria for seizures of the person contingent upon factual
predicates that police officers and lower courts can readily under-
stand.'4 While these factual prerequisites are theoretically less enigmat-
ic than judicial efforts to identify society's legitimate expectations of
liberty, in application, the adjudicative simplicity of these predicates is
likely to be illusory. Although the Hodari Court referred to "the
unquestioned seizure that occurred when [the officer] tackled Hodari," 9
the standard for seizures is not so easily applied when considering less
emphatic means of controlling the suspect's movements. 5
Short of complete physical incapacitation, a suspect who is experienc-
ing some restraint will also retain some freedom of movement u1 Even
after being tackled to the ground, Hodari retained the power to continue
the struggle and potentially break the officer's hold on him. The Court
recognized that if "Hodari had broken away and had then cast away the
cocaine, it would hardly be realistic to say that that disclosure had been
m4 See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
2A See infra note 301 and accompanying text.
'" See generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World-
On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. Prm. L. REv. 307 (1982) (arguing
that the Court must continue to strive for bright lines of permissible police conduct).
u Hodari 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1549.
For example, Justice Stevens queried in Hodari whether a seizure occurs if a
policeman's bullet wounds and partially incapacitates a suspect who continues to flee. See
111 S. Ct. at 1560 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2" Id at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihere willbe a period of time during which
the citizen's liberty has been restrained, but he or she has not yet completely submitted
to the show of force.").
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made during the course of an arrest." 2 If Hodari's continued resistance
would negate the existence of a seizure, one might inquire whether Los
Angeles motorist Rodney King" was seized prior to being beaten into
unconsciousness. The police officers who repeatedly struck King justified
their actions on the ground that King refused to obey police orders that
he lie motionless on the groundY 4  By continuing to move, King
arguably demonstrated that he was not under the absolute control of the
police. If Hodari means that no seizure occurs until the suspect is totally
immobilized and incapable of escape or resistance, 5 then the videotape
of the Rodney King arrest may spawn a series of sequels depicting
increasingly brutal efforts to incapacitate a suspect. Since such brutal
efforts would merely constitute an "attempted" arrest, they would be
beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment.' 6
In the event that something less than total incapacitation suffices for
a seizure, the Court must delineate what degree of control over the
suspect triggers Fourth Amendment protections. A suspect within the
grasp of the police simultaneously experiences some restraint and some
freedom of movement, just as police pursuit cuts off some of the suspect's
avenues of flight while others remain open. The limited control of the
- Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1550. But see State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d
1300, 1313-14 (Conn. 1992):
mhe relevant inquiry is whether the unlawful conduct of the police induced the
disposal of the incriminating items by the defendant. We reject the implication
of the dicta in Hodari D., that the chain of causation is broken when a suspect
escapes from an illegal seizure, thereby allowing the admission in evidence of
items subsequently discarded. We are persuaded that following this reasoning
could encourage illegal stops by the police.
Id
' King is the black motorist whose beating by four white Los Angeles police officers
was captured on videotape for all the world to see. The officers' first acquittal by a
predominantly white jury sparked three days of rioting, resulting in 60 deaths, more than
16,000 arrests and nearly $1 billion in property damage in Los Angeles. See Seth Mydans,
Tape of Beating by Police Revives Charge of Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,1991, at A18;
Lance Morrow, Rough Justice, TIME, April 1, 1991, at 16; see also Darlene Ricker,
Behind the Silence, 77 A.B.A. J. 45, 47 (July 1991) (quoting Los Angeles civil rights
attorney Carol Watson as saying that "beatings happen regularly at the end of a chase").
TnRM, May 11, 1992, at 30 ("The defense contended that the officers did not dare
simply to seize King and apply the cuffs for fear that the suspect might grab one of their
guns.... According to the defense, that meant it was all right to keep beating King until
he assumed a 'compliance posture' by lying still and putting his hands on his head.").
5 See Oquendo, 613 A.2d at 1309 (government argued that common law arrest
required "the effective control over or confinement of the suspect"') (emphasis added).
z' See Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 956-57 (7th Cir. 1992) (officer's actions prior
to "seizure," even if unjustified, are not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny).
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suspect's path of escape led the California Court of Appeals to conclude
in Hodari that a seizure occurred because the policeman's pursuit was "a
maneuver intended to block or 'otherwise control the direction or speed'
of Hodari's movement."
In contrast to the lower court, Hodari equates submission to police
authority with a complete surrender of physical movement. Hodari
ignores the fact that flight in response to police pursuit is itself a partial
surrender of freedom of movement and a form of subservience to police
authority. If the amendment merely recognized a right of physical
locomotion, distinguishing between the actions of remaining still and
running away might make some sense. If, however, the amendment
addresses a fundamental right of hberty-a right to be let alone, to ignore
the police and to go about one's business-then physical movement cannot
control constitutional interpretation. One'sbusiness may be to stay on that
street comer from which Hodari felt compelled to flee. Suppose that the
youths in Hodari had not fled at the approach of the police car but had,
instead, remained on the street comer until a police officer told them,
"Break it up, move along now." The youths would not only be free to
leave, they would be ordered to do so. A coerced decision to vacate a
location where one would rather remain is subservience to police
authority as much as is a coerced decision to stay in a location when one
would rather be free to leave. The relevant Fourth Amendment consider-
ation is the effect that police action has on a citizen's freedom to be let
alone and to decide if he wants to move from, or remain in, a particular
location. 8
By focusing on a complete surrender of physical movement, Hodari
fails to recognize a suspect's coerced or forced movement as the type of
submission to police authority which the Fourth Amendment covers.
Perhaps the Court feared that attaching constitutional significance to
2 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1559 n.14 (Stevens, L,
dissenting); see also Hawkins v. State, 758 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)
(defining a chase as "actions designed to control the direction of [the suspect's]
movements by 'closingin' on hin"); Oquendo, 613 A.2d at 1309 (quoting a former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Connecticut the Oquendo court explained that the
"sacred and inestimable right" of personal security means that no man can be "prevented
from removing himself from place to place, as he chuses [sic]") (citation omitted). But
see State v. Van Ackeren, 495 N.W.2d 630, 643-44 (Neb. 1993) (holding that when the
police deflated the tires on the defendant's vehicle to prevent him from using the vehicle
for flight, there was a seizure of the vehicle, but not a seizure of the defendant).
' In police-citizen encounters, "the police exercise complete control over the
interaction." State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 363 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1849
(1993).
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varying degrees of control over a suspect's movements would lead more
to a slippery slope than to a lucid guideline for defining seizures of a
person.' Nonetheless, in its effort to establish guidelines for Fourth
Amendment coverage, the Court has .failed to articulate the constitutional-
ly significant degree of control over a citizen that constitutes a Fourth
Amendment seizure.
The Court may have sought to avoid the entire question of "degrees"
of control over a suspect by suggesting that a seizure may be accom-
plished by "merely touching, however slightly, the body of the ac-
cused."260 The consequence of adopting this factual prerequisite for
seizures was suggested to the Court during oral arguments in Florida v.
Bosick,26' wherein the Court was urged to attach legal significance to
the police officer's having "physically touched the defendant's foot to get
his attention."'262 The Court's failure to address this contention implies
that the Hodari decision is supple enough to recognize that certain forms
of touching are insufficient for a seizure.263 If there is this implied
elasticity in Hodari's definition of a touching, why did the Hodari Court
give such short shrift to Justice Stevens' suggestion that the Fourth
Amendment is amenable to attempted seizures that occur even before any
touching takes place? Surely the Court is saying not that it will accept a
modification of the factual predicates for a seizure in order to shrink
Fourth Amendment coverage but, rather, that it must reject modifications
which expand Fourth Amendment protections"
"' See, e.g., United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 155 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
no seizure occurred as defendant's '!momentary halt on the sidewalk [did not] constitute[ ]
a yielding to [the police's] authority"); State v. Van Ackeren, 495 N.W.2d 630, 641 (Neb.
1993) (holding that no seizure occurred because defendant "failed to effectively submit
to the officer's assertion of authority" when the defendant momentarily paused, then
subsequently ran).
Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1550.
1ll S. Ct. 2382 (1991). In Bostick, police boarded a bus and randomly asked
passengers for (and received) consent to search several of their bags. Id. at 2384-85. The
police advised the defendant in this case that he had the right to refuse consent, but the
defendant consented nonetheless. Id. at 2385.
' Arguments Heard Florida v. Bostick 48 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3161, 3163 (March
6, 1991).
2 See United States v. Burrell, 286 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1972) (stating that physical
contact is acceptable if it is "a normal means of attracting a person's attention!).
2 The Court may have said just that in (1) its earlier rejection of the automatic
standing provisions of the amendment's exclusionary rule, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 138-40 (1978); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1980); Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980); and (2) its recent rejection of the common law
governing post-arrest detentions, see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661,
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If Hodari truly creates an absolute requirement for touching or
submission, then the Court has endorsed a bizarre view of individual
liberty in which constitutional protections vanish merely because the
victim of unlawful governmental action fails to perceive or otherwise
experience the violation. For example, reconsider the hypothetical
situation where the police secretly surround the suspect's residence.2 5
The suspect has not been touched nor has he yielded to a show of
authority, yet the government secretly acted to curtail the suspect's
liberty 2" in the same manner in which the government may act to
violate his privacy rights by conducting a surreptitious search of his
dwelling.
That the government may conceal and, thereby, negate its violation
of a citizen's constitutional rights is the type of contention that the Nixon
White House advanced during the Watergate era. The argument was put
forth by White House staffer G. Gordon Liddy, who had engineered the
break-in of a psychiatrist's office in an attempt to procure confidential
medical records of Daniel Ellsberg, the man credited with leaking the
"Pentagon Papers" to the New York Times.'26 When prosecuted for
conspiracy to infringe upon a citizen's privacy rights, Liddy asserted that
the conspiracy statute'" was inapplicable because of the covert nature
of the break-in.269 Liddy's convoluted defense rested upon the legally
correct principle that a break-in by common burglars does not implicate
Fourth Amendment rights because the amendment restricts only those
1671-75 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority opinion).
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
z" The suspect is free to move about inside his residence, but he is not free to depart.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
' The release of the Pentagon Papers had revealed embarrassing aspects of the
United States war effort in South Vietnam, thereby making Ellsberg a folk hero to the
anti-war movement. In an attempt to discredit Ellsberg, the burglars sought to discover
and reveal what was thought to be Ellsberg's sordid psychiatric history. See United States
v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 78 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970) provided:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his
having so exercised the same;
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for
aiy terms of years or for life.
Id
See Liddy, 542 F.2d at 80.
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searches conducted by government officials 70 Because the psychiatrist was
unaware at the time of the break-in that any government official had
interfered with his right to privacy, Liddy maintained that the burglars' initial
success in concealing their government connections removed them from the
coverage of the Fourth Amendment.27 ' This disingenuous argument was
summarily rejected by the courts"
The constitutionality of covert searches and seizures ofproperty has not
turned upon either the defendant's subjective awareness or a reasonable
person's objective perceptions of the government's actions.273 Because the
Fourth Amendment exists to limit and regulate the exercise of governmental
power,27 its coverage properly extends to any unilateral governmental
action that infringes upon a citizen's protected right of privacy. It is only
when addressing seizures of the person that the Court's examination of the
government's unilateral action mutates into a bilateral consideration of the
government's action and the citizen's perception of that action275
No matter how egregious the govemment unilateral conduct, Hodari
insists that a seizure does not occur until the suspect either consciously
submits to authority or experiences some actual touching of his person 6
It is apparent how the Justices would solve the mystery of whether there is
a sound when a tree falls in an unoccupied forest, and how they would
resolve the hypothetical in which the police secretly surround a suspect's
dwelling.277 In the forest of the Fourth Amendment, governmental
"o Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) ("[T]he
Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected
by a private party on his own initiative .... "); see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S.
649, 656 (1980) (stating that a wrongful search and seizure by a private party does not
violate the Fourth Amendment); Burdean v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921) (stating
that the Fourth Amendment only protects against searches and seizures under govemmen-
tal authority), overruled on other grounds by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
z" Liddy, 542 F.2d at 80.
22 Id. at 80-81; accord People v. Cantor, 324 N.E.2d 872, 876 (N.Y. 1975) (holding
that an unreasonable seizure occurred when police blocked the defendant's car and
approached him, even though the defendant thought that he was being threatened by
private citizens); see also United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that citizens must be notified of entries and seizures pursuant to "sneak and
peak" wanants which authorize a surreptitious entry for purposes of looking around or
taking photographs).
27 See infra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
7 See supra note 27.
27S See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text; California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550-51 (1991).
276 Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1550-51.
2 See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
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intrusions upon personal liberty do not exist until they are perceived by
a reasonable person.2 Furthermore, Hodari has distorted the Fourth
Amendment's goal of regulating governmental power by refusing to attach
constitutional significance to actual but secret restraint imposed by the
police 7
There are other anomalous results which flow from Hodart's
insistence that the amendment's coverage is exclusively dependent upon
a physical touching of the suspect or a show of authority that successfully
constrains the suspect's physical movement. For example, if a bigoted
police officer chases a suspect because he is black,280 successful capture
of the suspect is an illegal seizure.!8 But, if the suspect eludes cap-
ture," the very same chase becomes legitimate." This perplexing
" United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
See Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop"
and "Arrest," 43 OHIO ST. L.L 771, 814 (1982) (arguing that "the perception rather than
the fact of a restriction on freedom of movement" determines the scope of the Fourth
Amendment). Hodari's discussion of physical force (laying on of hands), however, is not
dependent upon reasonable perceptions. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
' See generally Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1472, 1495 n.5 (1988) (stating that "'blacks are more likely than whites
in similar situations to be stopped by the police on "suspicion""') (quoting Gwynne
Peirson, Institutional Racism and Crime Clearance, in BLACK PERSpECmTIVB ON CRm
AND THE CAM AL JusTiCE SYSTEM 111 (R.L. Woodson ed., 1977)); Shed Lynn
Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983)
(addressing the permissible components of probable cause and reasonable suspicion);
Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters "-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. L. REV. 243 (1991).
' Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v.
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 65 n.263 (1991)
('Te Court's view is that an officer does not have to have cause when he leaps at a
citizen, although the Court does not dispute that the officer is required to have cause the
instant he lands on the citizen.').
m Williamson, supra note 279, at 813 ("It is not necessary to say that one has a
constitutional right to hide from the police; it is sufficient to say that no government right
exists to demand the physical presence of the accused at any given time or at any given
place, except upon a showing of sufficient justification").
Although eluding capture, the suspect may discard evidentiary items which are seized
by the pursuing officer. If the suspect moves to suppress the items as the fruit of an
illegal seizure of his person, Hodari would require the Court to rule that there was no
seizure of the person prior to the successful capture of the suspect. California v. Hodari
D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (stating that "[tihe word 'seizure' readily bears
the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain
movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful").
2 The chase is legitimate to the extent that its legitimacy is beyond judicial scrutiny.
See infra note 348.
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result demonstrates that the applicability of the Fourth Amendment must
be determined by examining the unilateral actions of government
officials; the amendment's coverage should not turn upon an individual's
success or failure in eluding the police.2' A suspect's response to police
action is germane only when the government establishes that it did not
seek to impose unilateral restraint but, instead, merely invited the
suspect's acquiescence to an "encounter" with police.
B. Close Encounters of the Non-Fourth Amendment Kind
"rhe Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and
seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary cooperation."' The Court has
fleshed out this rudimentary principle of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence by articulating its vision of the type of police-citizen encounter that
constitutes a nonseizure: one in which a reasonable person would not
perceive any physical restraint of his freedom of movement and, thus, a
situation in which the defendant voluntarily submits to a police request
to stop and answer questions."' The flaw in this paradigmatic nonsei-
zure is that the Court has focused upon a hypothesized reasonable person
rather than asking whether the particular defendant voluntarily agreed to
the encounter with the police.'
i The dissent in Hodari stated that "the timing of the seizure is governed by the
citizen's reaction, rather than by the officer's conduct." Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct
at 1559 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2" Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991).
a6 See id. at 2386 ("Our cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur simply
because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions."); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("[L]aw enforcement officers do not
violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in
another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting
questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal
prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions).
m' '-fe danger in reasoning from hypothetical to actual results is that if the supposed
facts are not true to life, the judgment drawn from them will be equally artificial." John
M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection, 79 .
CRlm. L. & CiuMI~oNOOY 1105, 1133 (1988-89). In Fourth Amendment cases, the Court
has displayed a tendency to discuss hypothetical situations divorced from the actual facts
of the case. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 108, 113-14 (1986) (holding that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile's vehicle identification
number, which can be seen through the windshield, even though the actual search in
question involved an entry of the vehicle); South Dakota v. Oppennan, 428 U.S. 364, 366,
367 (1976) (holding that there is a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile due to
the public nature of cars and automobile travel, even though the inventory search in
question involved the closed compartments of a locked car).
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When a citizen relinquishes his freedom of movement in response to
a police officer's request, the appropriate judicial inquiry is whether that
surrender was prompted by government coercion or by the citizen's
exercise of freedom of choice. Labeling the citizen's acquiescence as
either a consensual seizure (which assumes that a seizure took place) or
a voluntary encounter (a nonseizure because of a waiver of the citizen's
right to liberty and freedom of movement) is problematic. Both consent
and waiver rest upon the assumption that there is a constitutionally
recognized liberty interest that would be protected but for the individual
citizent decision to relinquish any claim of this interest.2 Although the
Court may utilize evidence of objective behavior to infer an individual's
actual state of mind, the constitutional standards for consent and waiver
properly focus on the individual's personalized freedom of choice."' By
ignoring the individual' actual state of mind' in favor of MendenhallA
m Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388 ("Consent' that is the product of official intimidation
or harassment is not consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights when
they are coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to refuse.").
29 A seizure occurs when the suspect submits to "a show of force or authority which
left him no choice." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968); see also Bostick, 111
S. CL at 2394 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]t is exactly because [the suspect's]
'choice' is no 'choice' at all that police engage" in certain confrontational techniques);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (denouncing
police encounters where "[t]he citizen's choice is quietly to submit to whatever the
officers undertake or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate violence").
29 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980) (discussing the
distinction between a "seizure" and an "encounter" that intrudes upon no constitutionally
protected interest). Concepts of consent and waiver are irrelevant, however, when the
Court concludes that the citizen does not possess a legitimate liberty interest that need be
waived or relinquished. See infra note 307. Many of the Court's consent cases resemble
cases in which the Court has held that no search or seizure took place. See Peter
Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaning of "Searches" in the
Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRim. L. & CRaMINOLOGY 319, 326-38 (1984).
2' "In examining all the surrounding circumstances to detemine if in fact the consent
to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well
as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents." Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973) (emphasis added). Waiver requires "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (defining waiver in the context of the Sixth Amendment right of
counsel).
= The Mendenhall rule looks, "not to the subjective perceptions of the person
questioned, but rather, to the objective characteristics of the encounter that may suggest
whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave." California v. Hodari D., 499,
U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct 1547, 1558 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Focusing on a
hypothesized reasonable person, rather than on the defendant's actual state of mind,
permits the police "to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying
1993-941
K-ENTCKY LAW JOURNAL
hypothesized reasonable person test, the Court has in effect imposed consent
or waiver on unwilling citizens.
The usefulness of Mendenhall's reasonable person test is exhausted when
the insights gained by considering reasonable perceptions are added to other
evidence of the suspect's bona fide state of min&'z Although reasonable
perceptions may indicate that a police officer's request to stop and answer
questions would not coerce the average citizen, the Court should not discount
evidence that a defendant who had previously been stopped and beaten by
police might view such "requests" quite differently than the average citizen.
The highly publicized use of grievous force against Los Angeles motorist
Rodney King may well alter the public's, if not the Courtt, view of the
inocuousness of encounters with the police 5
Whose who have found-by reason of prejudice or misfortune-that
encounters with the police may become adversarial or unpleasant
only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights." Schnecldoth, 412 U.S. at 288
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
To the extent that it is difficult to establish a suspect's subjective state of mind,
[t]he only sensible guide for the police is that they should never rely on consent
... unless they must. If they do ... [rely] on consent, they should be prepared
to meet a heavy burden of proof that consent was in fact meaningfiuy given.
And even then, because of the difficulties of proof, they should expect to be
told often that the search was not proper.
Weinreb, supra note 27, at 64.
29 When the Court imposes certain forms of police conduct on unwilling citizens, see
infra text accompanying note 310, the Court dictates which forms of police conduct are
acceptable to general society; it does not ask whether a particular suspect actually
consented to the police conduct. Courts and commentators regard Mendenhall's reference
to consensual encounters as a mere fiction. See, e.g., United States v. Notorianni, 729
F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (the '!modest fiction that a person
being questioned by a policeman [will feel] free to say nothing and move on... makes
it possible to cope with drug traffic in a place like O'Hare airport"); Wayne R. LaFave,
"Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to Resolve Warrant, Grounds,
and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 417, 423 (1983-84) (stating that "it would be
a mere fiction to say that [most suspects that do not express a lack of consent] consent").
' Consent "is a particularly open concept, which refers to both an 'internal' state of
mind and an 'extemal' performance; consent is unequivocal and unquestioned only when
it includes both." Weinreb, supra note 27, at 55. Whether consent is voluntary is "a
question of fact to be determined from a totality of all the circumstances." Schnecdoth,
412 U.S. at 227; see also United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992)
(stating that "the personal traits of an individual are relevant to the issue of coercion");
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1454 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that defendant's
upbringing in Argentina, which instilled in him an acquiescence to police authority, is
relevant to coercion which would make him feel incapable of terminating the encounter).
' See supra note 253.
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without good cause will have grounds for worrying at any stop designed
to elicit signs of suspicious behavior. Being stopped by the police is
distressing even when it should not be terrifying, and what begins
mildly may by happenstance turn severe.
The Court's approach to the hypothetical voluntariness of police-
citizen encounters is also inconsistent with its treatment of the secondary
actions that normally accompany such encounters. If the police officer's
request to stop is followed by a secondary request to inspect identification
papers 7 or the suspect's belongings,"3 the Court forgoes an inquiry
into the perceptions of a hypothesized reasonable person in order to
ascertain whether the particular defendant made a voluntary choice to
accede to the secondary request. By allowing a waiver of privacy
rights in personal belongings to turn upon the defendant's existing state
of mind, whereas a waiver of liberty interests in freedom of movement
turns upon the hypothesized perceptions of a reasonable person, the Court
' Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 465 (1990) (Stevens, L,
dissenting).
I7 The constitutionality of a police officer's request for identification papers is an
unsettled area of law. See generally Majorie E. Murphy, Encounters of a Brief KimL On
Arbitrariness and Police Demands for Identification, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.I 207 (discussing
the "undefined and broadening use of police/citizedi encounters to identify an individuar)
(citations omitted). In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979), the Court suggested that
a seizure occurred when uniformed officers approached a suspect and asked him to
identify himself and explain his presence in the area. But see INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 216 (1984) ("[O]ur recent decision inRoyer plainly implies that interrogation relating
to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute
a Fourth Amendment seizure.") (citation omitted).
' In United States v. Analla, 975 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1853 (1993), the Fourth Circuit held that the initial approach by the police towards the
suspect was governed by the standard for seizures of the person-"an objective test, not
a subjective one." Id at 124. Thus, the fact that the particular suspect "thought, based on
his experience with Moroccan police, that he would be restrained or even tortured should
he try to leave" was irrelevant. Id. The court, finding no seizure, held that the subsequent
request to search the suspect's vehicle was governed by the standard for consensual
searches-'a factual question determined in light of the totality of the circumstances." Id.
at 125. Consequently, it was relevant that the defendant was "24 years old... had...
graduated from high school and had attended some college ... appeared intelligent,
[and] articulated his views and positions well." Id.
' A citizen's "decision to cooperate with law enforcement officers authorizes the
police to conduct a search without first obtaining a warrant only if the cooperation is
voluntary." Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991); see also United States v.
Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[TIhe determination of consent to search is
subjective:).
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is creating an artificial and unprincipled distinction between seizures of
property and seizures of a person. Treating the antecedent request to stop
as constitutionally distinct from the ancillary request to inspect personal
belongings creates unnecessary and confusing distinctions between
voluntary searches of property and voluntary seizures of the person. This
dichotomy between searches of property and seizures of a person strains
credulity and has caused confusion in the lower courts."°
When the Court imposes "consensual" encounters on citizens who
have not in fact consented, the Court masquerades a prescriptive
statement as a descriptive observation of the perceptions of a reasonable
person.3" The Court's duty to prescribe which forms of police power
may be imposed on an unwilling citizen is a necessary and proper part of
Fourth Amendment interpretation. The Court, however, should face this
duty openly" by addressing the manner in which the amendment
reconciles the clash, inherent in street encounters, between police power
and individual freedom. The Court cannot sidestep the Fourth Amend-
ment's applicability to encounters between police and citizens by invoking
" The history of United States v. Maragh, 695 F. Supp. 1223 (D.D.C. 1988),
illustrates the confusion surrounding consensual seizures of a person and voluntary
consent to search the person's belongings. The trial court initially held that the police
officers' intimidating approach to the defendant constituted a seizure of the person and,
therefore, contaminated the subsequent search of the defendant's handbag. Iad at 1225. The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the finding as to a seizure of the person, but
remanded the case for further consideration of the issue of voluntary consent to search the
handbag. United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
880 (1990). The D.C. Circuit noted that the trial court had "treated the tests for seizure
and voluntary consent as identical. Although there is overlap in these tests, they are not
identical." Id On remand, the District Court found that the conduct was sufficiently
intimidating to cause coerced consent to search the handbag. United States v. Maragh, 756
F. Supp. 18, 22 (D.D.C. 1991).
301 This masquerade has created confusion among the lower courts. The Second,
Eighth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits regard the Mendenhall test as a question of law to be
reviewed de novo. United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1425 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 593
(1991); United States v. Mines, 883 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997
(1989); Maragh, 894 F.2d at 417. However, the Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits appear
to apply a "clearly erroneous" standard of review to the lower court's factual finding
regarding a seizure. United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir. 1989);. United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d
316, 321 (7th Cir. 1989).
31 "A body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is
referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds
for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in words." Oliver W. Holmes,
The Path of the Law, in CoLEcTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 186 (1920).
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a supposedly descriptive observation ofa hypothesized reasonable person;
nor can the Court silently overturn Katz v. United States and Terry v.
Ohio by reverting to common law requirements for corporeal restraint of
a suspect's physical movements.
C. Incorporeal Infringements Upon Liberty
"Talk or walk, it's your choice. But .... 303
United States v. Mendenhall14 and California v. Hodari D.305 rest
Fourth Amendment coverage upon the citizen's response to a police-
initiated encounter. Independent of that response, neither case attaches
legal significance to the officer's unilateral conduct in initiating the
encounter: the officer's approach, his request that the citizen stop, his
invitation to the suspect to submit to interrogation."° By judicial fiat,
police may impose these manifestations of power 7 upon all citizens
" See infra notes 316-19 and accompanying text (describing this scenario). A "real-
life" talk or walk scenario arose in Columbus, Ohio, when the police department utilized
"saturation patrols.' The police department directed that, under these patrols, numerous
officers descend upon high-crime neighborhoods and approach passersby. They would
then ask for identification, inquire as to what the pedestrians were doing in the
neighborhood, and rim warrant checks on suspicious persons. Adrienne L. Meiring, Note,
Walking the Constitutional Beat: Fourth Amendment Implications of Police Use of
Saturation Patrols and Roadblocbl, 54 Omo ST. L.L 497, 500 (1993). If an individual
objected to the questioning, he was free to leave but was told that 'the area [was] one
of high crime and if the person [was] there seeking drugs or prostitution, an arrest [was]
likely, if not certain."' Id. at 501 (quoting ACE is Played Citizens Back Police Clean
Sweeps, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 15, 1991, at A6). The officer then filled out field
identifier cards which listed the name, age, and physical description of the pedestrian. The
card was sent to the narcotics bureau or the crime analysis unit to check possible
connections to local crimes. Id. at 500-01.
446 U.S. 544 (1980).
... 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
'0' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), spoke to situations where a "police officer
accosts an individual" Id. at 16 (emphasis added). WEBsTER's, supra note 151, at 12,
defines "accost" as "to approach and speak to" or "speak to without having first been
spoken to" or "to confrot usu[ally] in a somewhat challenging or defensive way."
311 Unlike the Supreme Court, lower courts have struggled to define the point at which
an officer's approach triggers Fourth Amendment protections. See Richardson v. United
States, 520 A.2d 692, 697 (D.C.) (holding the following remarks not to be a seizure:
'Police. Wait a second. We want to talk to you"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987);
Johnson v. United States, 468 A.2d 1325, 1327 (D.C. 1983) (holding the call of "come
here, police officer" to be a seizure), and vacated, 496 A.2d 592 (D.C. 1985). But see
Hodarl, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1550 (noting that the Fourth Amendment "does not
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without exception. The Court does not invoke Mendenhall to ask how
reasonable persons perceive the opening stages of a police-citizen
encounter; instead, the Court tells us that there are no constitutional
restrictions on an officer's confronting a citizen with mere "requests" that
the citizen stop and answer questions."' In contrast to the nation's
seemingly increased sensitivity to sexual harassment in the
workplace,'" the outdated aphorism that "there's no harm in asking'
governs street encounters. Thus, there can be no legally significant
harassment during incorporeal encounters between police and citizens
because the Fourth Amendment is only applicable once the officer's
request to stop becomes a demand with which the suspect complies.
By refusing to place constitutional restrictions on an officer's initial
approach to a citizen, the Court has decreed that police officers need not
justify their desire to single out and confront a particular individual. The
hapless, though presumptively innocent, individual must suffer this form
of police scrutiny as part of the cost of walking on a public street. If a
citizen singled out for an encounter should be bold enough to ask why an
officer has approached him,"0 the officer is entitled to respond, "I'm
remotely apply, however, to the prospect of a policeman yelling 'Stop, in the name of the
law!' at a fleeing form that continues to flee. That is no seizure.").
3- See Macin, supra note 44, at 1302 (opining that the "Court... [turns] a blind eye
to street encounters ... [by excluding them from Fourth Amendment coverage] even
when these confrontations are perceived as seizures by the citizenry at large").
3- See generally Polly B. Elliott, Sexual Harassment Reports up a Year Since Hill
Testimony, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Labrary,
Current File (discussing the marked increase in sexual harassment claims after the
Clarence Thomas Senate confirmation hearings).
3"0 By relieving the police of any burden to justify their approach of a citizen, the
Court has forced citizens to bear the burden of challenging or resisting police authority.
Such challenges, however,
will not go unnoticed. In fact, they can be seen to push the encounter to a new
level wherein any further slight to an officer, however subtle, provides sufficient
evidence to a patrolman that he may indeed be dealing with a certifiable [jerk]
and that the situation is in need of rapid clarification.
John Van Maanen, Street Justice, in POLICE BEHAVIOR 299 (Richard J. Lundmun ed.,
1980). The officer may clarify the situation by "teaching a lesson" to an uncooperative
citizen
"[T]eaching' occupies a particularly prominent position in the police repertoire
of possible responses. Thus, the uncooperative and surly motorist finds his
sobriety rudely questioned, or the smug and haughty college student discovers
himself stretched over the hood of a patrol car and the target of a mortifying
and brusque body search. The object of such degradation ceremonies is simply
to reassert police control and demonstrate to the citizen that his behavior is
considered inappropriate. Teaching techniques are numerous, with threat,
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patrolling this street You walk my beat and I approach you whenever I
want."3 " "Instead of being regarded as a person, whose interests clash
with those of the police, the suspect is here told that in some important
way he [or the street] belongs to the police and not to himself.'3 In
effect, the police, not citizens, are sovereign on the streets of America,
and every officer has a roving commission to satisfy his curiosity about
anyone he encounters on the street. If Hodari seeks to reinstate the
common law of arrests," it is returning our nation to the pre-revolu-
tionary period, which has been characterized as placing "the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer.""3 4 In rejecting Hodari
based on state constitutional law, the Supreme Court of Hawaii conclud-
ed:
We cannot allow the police to randomly "encounter" individuals
without any objective basis for suspecting them of misconduct and then
place them in a coercive environment in order to develop reasonable
suspicion to justify their detention. This investigative technique is based
on the proposition that an otherwise innocent person, who comes under
police scrutiny for no good reason, is not innocent unless he or she
convinces the police that he or she is. Such a procedure is anathema to
our constitutional fte3edms?'5
ridicule, and harassment among the more widely practiced.
Id. at 304.
31 See Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J.
1161, 1161 (1965) ("[Tihe officer told me he had the right to stop anyone any place any
time-and for no reason ....:).
312 WHrIE, Mqra note 1, at 195. Professor White's comment referred to a search
incident to arrest, where the officer testified to the following: "I just searched him. I didn't
think about what I was looking for. Ijust searched him" Id. at 187 (quoting United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 251 (1973)); see also Reich, supra note 311, at 1164 (stating
that "what is at stake is the respect and dignity due to each individual from his
government").
31 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
314 John Adams, Abstract of the Argument, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OP JOHN ADAMS 134,
142 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (comments of James Otis). Justice
Scalia recently invoked the common law's approval of stopping, but not frisking,
"suspicious night-walkers." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2140-41 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring). However, Scalia considered such stops justified as a Fourth
Amendment seizure not because of the night-walker's presence on a public street, but
because the night-walker was acting suspiciously. In contrast to the stop/seizure of a
suspicious night-walker, a police-citizen encounter is classified as a nonseizure and need
not be justified by any suspicious activity of the citizen pedestrian.
31 State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 365 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 1849
(1993).
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By endorsing a police officer's unfettered power to single out and
approach innocent citizens, the Court has given short shrift to the chilling
effects such encounters may have on the citizenry's right to be secure in
their persons. Suppose, for example, the interrogating officer states: "Talk
or walk, it's your choice. However, if you do walk, we are going to be
checking up on you." '316 By offering the option to "talk or walk," the
36 A variation on the "talk or wall' hypothetical arose before the Iowa Supreme
Court in State v. Johnson-Hugi, 484 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1992). The court noted that the
"defendant was presented with the specific alternative of either cooperating as a
confidential informant or being arrested; her decision to cooperate necessarily precluded
the possibility of there being an 'arrest."'Id. at 601. The dissent, however, insisted that
a Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred because the defendant "was not free to ignore
the request of the officers, since had she done so, they would have reinstituted criminal
proceedings." Id. at 603 (Snell, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d
1526, 1532 (10th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing Forida v. Bostick on the grounds that a
person singled out by the police is more apt to feel that he is the specific target of
suspicion than is someone who is one among many being questioned); United States v.
Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (opining that telling a suspect that an
investigation had focused on him and that an innocent person would be willing to
cooperate with police is coercive); State v. Ossey, 446 So. 2d 280, 285 (La.) (holding that
there was a seizure when defendant "was told that he was the focus of investigation'),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 916 (1984).
But see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISREAL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10(b),
at 235-36 (2d ed. 1992) (when police threaten to obtain a search wan-ant, the suspect has
not been coerced into consenting to the search; he has simply "been correctly advised of
his legal situation").
Situations like the "talk or wal' hypothetical reach the criminal courts only when
there is evidence to be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. If the
suspect discards evidentiary items while walking away, and if the officer seizes those
items, a court may have to detemiine whether the suspect's decision to discard the
property was a wholly voluntary abandonment or one caused by the officer's actions. See
United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1979) ("While it is true that a
criminal defendant's voluntary abandonment of evidence can remove the taint of an illegal
stop or arrest, it is equally true that for this to occur the abandonment must be truly
voluntary and not merely the product of police misconduct.") (citations omitted); see also
State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 1313 (Conn. 1992) ("The relevant inquiry is whether
the unlawful conduct of the police induced the disposal of the incriminating items by the
defendant.").
Encounters or pursuits which stop short of a physical touching of the suspect also
may give rise to § 1983 suits. See, for example, Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534 (5th Cir.
1986), a section 1983 case where the plaintiff claimed that he was "alaried" and suffered
mental anguish after being chased by the police at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour.
Id. at 535. The court noted that the pursuing officers' actions may have "crossed the
constitutional line that would make their pursuit and harassment actionable under section
1983," but held that this was a determination for the trier of fact and remanded the case.
Id. at 538.
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officer has recognized that the citizen is "free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." '317 The citizen's freedom,
however, is less than an unabridged liberty to depart; 8 although he
may terminate the encounter free of physical restraint, the citizen still
fEces the possible consequences of a threatened investigation."9
Of course, the police are entitled to conduct many types of indepen-
dent investigations which do not implicate Fourth Amendment rights.
Only an unrealistically broad reading of the right to be let alone would
categorize all investigations of a suspect as searches or seizures. The
relevant question is not whether the threatened investigation itself will
infringe upon Fourth Amendment rights, but whether the police may
explicitly or implicitly threaten to use their legitimate investigative
powers in an attempt to limit the citizen's freedom of movement."o
The question of the legal significance of the officer's "talk or we
investigate" ultimatum cannot be resolved by applying the Mendenhall
standard of asking how a reasonable person would perceive this
caveat. 2 The average citizen will recognize that the officer's threat
creates some degree of incorporeal restraint on the unfettered exercise of
the citizen's freedom of movement.' The question for the Court is
31 Florida v. Bostick, Ill S. CL 2382, 2387 (1991).
31 'Even though momentary, a seizure occurs whenever an objective evaluation of
a police officer's show of force conveys the message that the citizen is not entirely free
to leave-in other words, that his or her liberty is being restrained in a significant way."
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. CL 1547, 1558 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
"9"While [governmental] restraint does not have to be physical, it nonetheless must
result in a restriction of the defendant's autonomy." United States v. Madison, 936 F.2d
90, 93 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 489 (2d Cir. 1991)
("[A] 'seizure' for the purposes of the fourth amendment [sic] is not defined by whether
an individual has halted his forward progress in response to police conduct, but rather is
defined by the coercive nature of the police conduct.").
32 "[Tihe Fourth ... Amendment] require[s] that a consent not be coerced, by
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For no matter how subtly the
coercion was applied, the resulting 'consent' would be no more than a pretext for the
unjustified police intnsion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed." Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
"z United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("[A] person has been
'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was .not free to leave").
3- Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575-76 (1988) (the Court conceded that the
police conduct was "somewhat intimidating," but '"not 'so intimidating' that [the
defendant] could reasonably have believed that he was not free to disregard the police
presence and go about his business).
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whether this form of incorporeal restraint is meaningful enough to trigger
Fourth Amendment coverage'3 The answer, according to Hodari, is that
the only legally significant form of restraint is one that places the citizen
under the physical control of the police.'l Such an answer is surprising in
light of the Court's opposite conclusion when considering whether physical
trespass is a necessary prerequisite for Fourth Amendment searches and
seizures of property.3" Once Katz v. United States326 recognized that
governmental action falling short of physical trespass could threaten privacy
interests, it would seem to follow that governmental action filing short of
physical restraint could threaten liberty interests. The Fourth Amendment
becomes "curioser and curioser' when a police approach to a motor vehicle
momentarily stopped at a toll booth is considered a seizure,327 whereas the
amendment is inapplicable to a police officer decision to single out and
intimidate a pedestrian.
As trite as it may seem, there is little harm in categorizing a momentary
stop at a toll booth as a seizure of the vehicle. Courts can uphold such
seizures as constitutionally reasonable as long as all vehicles are stopped in
a nondiscriminatory manner.328 Labeling the stop a nonseizure, as opposed
to a reasonable seizure, however, would force the courts to turn a deaf ear to
charges that the government had targeted a particular vehicle for dissimilar
treatment. In Carson v. Commonwealth,329 the actual toll booth case, the
dissent objected to the further intrusion upon privacy and liberty that occurred
323 The Court has stated that "[a] 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 712 (1984) ("[lt cannot be said that anyone's possessory interest [in a can of ether,
containing a police beeper] was interfered with in a meaningful way.").
31A See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991) (0he
word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical
force to restrain movement... ."); see also Brewer v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596
(1989) ("Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of
physical control.').
'2 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
3' 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
3 Carson v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 415, 417 (Va. 1992) (Hassell, J., dissenting)
('When [the officer] approached [the defendant's] car, a seizure occurred within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.'); cf. State v. Van Ackeren, 495 N.W.2d 630, 635,
641, 643-44 (Neb. 1993) (holding that the defendant was not seized when he paused and
then ran from an officer who ordered him to "hold it a minute," but holding that the
defendant's vehicle was seized when police deflated two of the vehicle's tires to prevent
him from fleeing in the vehicle).
328 See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-52 (1990). But see
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-61 (1979) (random stop of vehicle is an
unreasonable seizure).
319 421 S.E.2d 415 (Va. 1992).
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when a policeman at the toll booth peered into selected vehicles?"° The
need to regulate a police officerb potentially discriminatory or arbitrary
treatment of selected citizens-apoint that the Hodari Court missed-is apoint
particularly relevant in street encounters between police and pedestrians?"
A situation similar to the toll booth case arises when a traffic patrolman
directs all pedestrians to cross the street at the crosswalk. The officer is
interfering with the pedestrians' freedom of movement, but such nondiscrimi-
natory interference is entirely reasonable. The situation changes, however, if
the officer singles out a particular pedestrian and asks him to wait on the
comer until he answers a few questions. This idiosyncratic treatment of a
citizen may or may not be constitutionally reasonable depending upon the
officer's justification for targeting the particular pedestrian. However, the
reasonableness of the officerb justification will be subjected to judicial
scrutiny only if the court first classifies his conduct as a seizure or attempted
seizure of the citizen. While Hodari concedes that a seizure may occur if the
pedestrian complies with the request to wait on the comer," Hodari insists
that the Fourth Amendment has no application to the officer's potentially
discriminatory actions, so long as the citizen refuses to stop his physical
movement 33
A citizen's refusal to terminate his physical movement forced the Fourth
Circuit to probe the possibility of modifying Hodari to encompass a
"fimctional equivalent of physical restraint." The defendant in United
States v. Wilson' was approached in an airport terminal, where he con-
sented to a frisk of his person and a search of his carry-on bag. When the
defendant sought to leave, however, the DEA agent asked to search the
defendant's coat. The defendant refused and started to walk away, but the
agent accompanied him and "began to reason with him: 3' When the angry
defendant demanded to know why he was being stopped, the agent replied,
"I am not stopping you, you are free to leave, you can leave if you like."337
The defendant walked away on at least four occasions, but each time the
agent accompanied him and continued to "reason" with himY2
30 Carson, 421 S.E.2d at 416 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
331 In police-citizen encounters, "the police exercise complete control over the
interaction. The course of the questioning and the insinuative nature of the questions are
left entirely to the discretion of the officer." State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 363 (Haw.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1849 (1993).
3" California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550-52 (1991).
'3 111 S. Ct. at 1550.
"4 United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 123 (4th Cir. 1991).
m a
3m Id. at 118.337 Id.
" Id at 118-19. In State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
1993-941
KENTucKY LAW JOUrNAL
Finding that the defendant "was not physically restrained by the
police,"339 the Fourth Circuit faced "an unusual variant on the increasingly
common theme of random police-citizen encounters and warrantless searches
of persons or their belongings." '  The Fourth Circuit held that "physical
movement alone does not negate the possibility that a seizure may neverthe-
less have occurred," and that police persistence in the face of the defen-
dantb "unequivocal unwillingness to engage in further conversation!'' "
amounted to "the funcional equivalent of physical restraint, which, in the
absence of justification, is proscribed by the Fourth Amendment." '
Although troubled by Hodarih insistence upon physical restraint or submis-
sion, the court concluded that the coercive nature of the policenanb unilateral
actions "is the type of state interference with personal security that the Fourth
Amendment proscribes."
The facts of Wilson confirm the air of unreality that surrounds the
Supreme Court's discussion of situations in which the police accost the
defendant, but the defendant refuses to yield to their authority and is then
permitted to go on his way. As numerous commentators have noted, this
situation rarely occurs because, "in fact, citizens almost never feel free to end
an encounter initiated by a police officer and walk away." 5 When the
police ask the suspect to stop, he is not likely to ignore them. If an audacious
citizen such as the defendant in Wilson dares to ignore the police and walk
away, a chase is likely to ensue.3
A chase, however, is merely the mid-point of the tripartite police action
that characteristically occurs when a suspect refuses to submit to a police-
Ct. 1849 (1993), the court condemned the Honolulu Police Department's similar use of
a "walk and talk drug interiction program" in which police are "trained to engage in
'consensual encounters' whereby airline passengers are approached and, ina 'conversation-
al manner,' requested to consent to a search of their luggage or person!' Id. at 360, 365.
339 Wilson, 953 F.2d at 122.
34 Id. at 120.
341 Id. at 123.
342 Id.
3" Id.344 Id.
34 Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining
When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. GLu L. & Cs]MimOOoy 437, 439
(1988).
3 "It would be difficult to find in the annals of the law any instances in which a
citizen ha[s] successfully exercised" the right to walk away. State v. Shy, 373 So. 2d 145,
149 (La. 1979) (Dennis, J., dissenting). In Hodari, the defendant "attempted to end 'the
conversation' before it began and soon found himself literally 'not free to leave' when
confronted by an officer running toward him head-on who eventually tackled him to the
ground." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 1.11 S. Ct. 1547, 1559 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
[Vol. 82
RIGHT TO BE SECURE
citizen encounter. As demonstrated in Hodari, an encounter begins with the
officer' initial approach, which often gives rise to a pursuit which may in
turn culminate with the final capture of the fleeing suspect. 'The question,"
Justice Stevens suggested in Hodari, "is whether the Fourth Amendment was
implicated at the earlier or the later moment."' 7 By withholding Fourth
Amendment coverage until the final stage of an encounter, when some
touching occurs or physical control is achieved, the Court has refused to place
constitutional limitations on the earliest manifestations of police power-the
approach and the chase.
So long as the courts refuse to apply the Fourth Amendment to the initial
stages of police-citizen encounters, police conduct at such stages may be as
arbitrary and unreasonable as the police choose4 9 Hodari simply ignores
the hard reality of street encounters.
The First Amendment remains healthy because possible invasions of it can
usually be challenged in a civilized, scholarly way in a dignified appellate
court. Constitutional rights that must be defended, if at all, on a lonely street
on a highway at night, in a police station or before ajustice of the peace are
always in trouble?'
347Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1559 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
-4 The holding in Hodari accepts what Teny v. Ohio rejected- the government's
attempts "to isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between
the policeman and the citizen." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968); see also Shirley M.
Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdiredions of a Constitutional Right of Privacy, 26
REC. N.Y.BA. 546, 552 (1971) (stating that government conduct not classified as a
search or seizure is immunized from scrutiny, even though it results from such
illegitimate, or even malicious, motives as governmental curiosity, a desire to gather and
report interesting information, or personal distaste for the political philosophies or
lifestyles of certain citizens).
3 9 
'The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures not unreasonable,
unjustified or outrageous conduct in general. Therefore, pre-seizure conduct is not subject
to Fourth Amendment scrutiny." Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992)
(citations omitted).
310 Reich, supra note 311, at 1169. The Court has also ignored the unpleasant reality
that street encounters involve a disproportionate number of one minority group-black
teenagers. See Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 280,
at 1495 it5 (citing studies indicating that blacks are more frequently stopped by police
on suspicion than are whites). See generally Johnson, stpra note 280 (discussing impact
of race on police officers' decision to detain suspects and potential Fourth Amendment
implications); Maclin, supra note 280 (discussing impact of race on Fourth Amendment
seizure decisions). This group is particularly vulnerable to identification and harassment
in public because a lack of access to private facilities often forces black teenagers onto
the public streets. The right to be let alone in public may be the only form of privacy or
personal security that a black youth possesses. Therefore, a black teenager whom a police
officer humiliates in front of others is likely to form a lasting disrespect for law. This
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While completed seizures can be addressed after the fact, the Court has
exacerbated the arbitrariness of street encounters by spuming the need to
prescribe in advance the amendment' restrictions on a policenans approach
and pursuit of citizens. "W]veryone, including the police, must live under
rules. All organizations, and all officials, get out of hand if they do not have
rules to guide them, if they do not do their work within limits:"351 Appro-
priate judicial scrutiny of the manifestations of police power inherent in the
earliest stages of police-citizen encounters requires that the Court adopt a
sagacious definition of attempted seizures.
V. A MODEL FOR DEFIMG ATIEMPTED SrIzuREs
A constitutional definition of attempted seizures352 may be formulated
by drawing upon the approach to defining the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment in Katz v. United States"3 and by drawing upon established concepts
insidious form of social harm cannot be discounted merely because police harassment
stops short of what the Court refers to as a "genuine, successful seizure." Hodari, 499
U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1551.
... Reich, supra note 311, at 1171; see also New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882,
884 (1951) (Douglas, L, dissenting) ("Absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the
beginning of the end of liberty:). Professor Reich also explained the lack of effective
remedies for controlling the police:
There is always the right to defend against any criminal charge that may result
[from a police-citizen encounter]. There is always a tort action for false arrest
Perhaps in some extreme circumstances there might be grounds for an action
under one of the civil rights statutes, or for an injunction against a continuing
police practice. But these remedies are often costly, time-consuming, and
ultimately unsuccessful. No one effectively "polices the police."
Reich, supra note 311, at 1163.
31 The Court may approach failed efforts to achieve physical control over a suspect
in one of two ways. If physical control is accepted as the sine qua non of seizures, the
Court must address whether the Fourth Amendment encompasses failed attempts to
achieve physical control. Conversely, the Court may expand the concept of completed
seizures by recognizing that an unsuccessful effort to establish physical control achieves
another result which triggers Fourth Amendment protections-an infringement upon liberty
consisting of "the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding' citizens. Michigan Dep't
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990). Either approach focuses on the question
of extnding the amendment to police action that fails to achieve physical control. The
difference in the approaches lies in whether the lack of physical control is addressed
under the rubric of attempted seizures or under an expanded concept of completed
seizures. While it may be largely a matter of semantics, this author has employed the term
"attempted seizure" in order to avoid confusion with Hodari's definition of "genuine,
successful seizures." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991).
" 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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used in defining attempted crimes. The Katz approach to the Fourth
Amendment and the laws governing attempted crimes share a common
concern for the social consequences that flow from an actor's unilateral
conduct. Rather than focusing upon purely physical consequences, as
Hodari does, these seemingly unrelated areas of the law require a judicial
determination as to whether the actor's conduct imposes upon society
certain undesirable consequences that our legal system seeks to prohib-
it 3
54
A. Applying the Katz Standard to Attempted Seizures
If the government places wiretaps on public telephones, a citizen
retains the freedom to avoid using the telephones and thereby maintains
some control over his privacy. When a pursuing officer points his weapon
at a fleeing suspect, the suspect retains the freedom to try to outrun the
bullet In neither extreme example has the government established its
complete physical control over the situation by eliminating all vestiges of
the citizen's freedom of choice. In both cases, however, the government
has significantly narrowed the citizen's options355 and thus burdened or
threatened the citizen's unfettered exercise of Fourth Amendment rights.
When addressing governmental threats to the privacy of personal
communications, Katz requires the Court to consider whether the
government may impose the unrestricted use of a particular form of
surveillance upon a free society.3 By placing a form of police action
beyond the control of the Fourth Amendment, the Court permits the
police to inflict arbitrary power on citizens." The Court, rightly or
34 See United States v. Wthite, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws
that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present. Since
it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we
should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without
examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.
3s The California Court of Appeals held that the officer's pursuit in Hodari was a
seizure because the pursuit controlled "the direction or speed" of the suspect's movement
Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1559 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf. PERKINs
& BOYCE, supra note 70, at 224 (stating that for purposes of false imprisonment, a person
is not confined "nmerely because he is prevented from going in some one direction, or in
several directions, so long as he may freely depart by some other known way").
3- See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concuning).
S' When a police activity "is not labeled a 'search' or 'seizure,' it is subject to no
significant restrictions of any kind. It is only 'searches' or 'seizures' that the fourth
amendment [sic] requires to be reasonable: police activities of any other sort may be as
unreasonable as the police please to make them." Amsterdam, sura note 36, at 388.
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wrongly, has held that citizens may legitimately expect that the govern-
ment will not eavesdrop on their telephone communications at their
pleasure, but must suffer the possibility that their conversations with
presumed confidants may in fact be conversations with government
spies." The wisdom of the Court's decision in any particular case is
subject to debate because the Katz standard is not a panacea which
ensures a "correct" result."' Given the present political and judicial
climate, it may be a benefit rather than a drawback of Katz that it
employs a methodology which can be utilized to either expand or contract
individual rights. While Katz may not guarantee a correct answer, it does
pose the correct question by forcing the Court to look beyond common
law conventions in order to resolve the modem-day conflict between
personal autonomy and collective security.' Katz faces this question
openly when defining searches and seizures of property that threaten
protected rights of privacy.36' The Court, however, has been less than
3- White, 401 U.S. at 749 ("However strongly a defendant may trust an apparent
colleague, his expectations in this respect are not protected by the Fourth Amendment
when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with
the authorities."); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (stating that the risk
of betrayal by one's friends and confidants is .'inherent in the conditions of human
society' and .'[i]t is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak'")
(quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1966) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); cf.
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967) ('"[W]e accept the premise that the informer
is a vital part of society's defensive arsenal.") (quoting State v. Burnett, 201 A.2d 39, 44
(N.J. 1964)).
31 "Fourth amendment [sic] doctrine is driven by society's attitudes and beliefs about
the relative value of autonomy and security. In this continuing struggle between the
individual and the collective there is only one rule: neither may utterly dominate the
other-chaos and tyranny are equally to be avoided." Junker, supra note 287, at 1183; see
also WHITE, supra note 1, at 195 ("the task of the Court under the fourth amendment [sic]
is to find a way to talk about an irreconcilable clash of interests that does some real
justice to the claims on both sides").
31 See, for example, Justice Harlan's approach to the constitutionality of unegulated
electronic monitoring. Justice Harlan maintained that such practices:
undermine that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one another
that is characteristic of individual relationships between citizens in a free
society.
... Were third-party bugging a prevalent practice, it might well smother
that spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious and defiant
discourse-that liberates daily life .... All these values are sacrificed by a rule
of law that permits official monitoring of private discourse limited only by the
need to locate a willing assistant.
White, 401 U.S. at 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
361 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51. "[E]ffective articulation of the fourth amendment
[sic] threshold in the language of 'privacy' assumes a willingness on the part of courts to
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forthright in facing its responsibility to define seizures of the person that
threaten protected liberty interests.
When addressing governmental threats to individual liberty, the Court
has told citizens that any threats to personal autonomy that fail to touch
or achieve physical control over the citizen are beyond the coverage of
the amendment, beyond judicial scrutiny, and thus a necessary cost of
living under our system of government." Again, this result may or
may not be "correct," but by resting this view of modem American
society on common law definitions of arrest, the Court has failed to
balance liberty interests against law enforcement needs in the same
manner in which the Court balances law enforcement needs against
privacy interests. Although Katz expands Fourth Amendment searches and
seizures of property beyond common law concepts, Hodari merely
accepts and adopts the common law approach to seizures of the per-
son,363 as if the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
seizures of the person has no higher purposes, no discernible values, and
no aims or context beyond that of common law arrests.
The right of privacy and the right to liberty can be placed on equal
footing if the Court discards the inconsistent approaches to Fourth
Amendment coverage reflected in Katz and Hodari. Harmonization of
search and seizure law requires that the Court recognize that the Fourth
Amendment encompasses those attempted3" seizures of the person that
infringe upon an individual's legitimate expectation of liberty. Further
synchronization of search and seizure law will occur when judicial efforts
to identify constitutionally protected rights of individual liberty closely
parallel the Court's prior efforts to identify legitimate rights of privacy.
By substituting the term "liberty" in place of "privacy," the Court can
utilize the Katz approach to define seizures of the person. That is,
legitimate liberty interests are threatened whenever the unrestricted use
of a form of government power cannot be imposed on a free society.'
Borrowing from the type of analysis utilized in Katz, the Court may
deal openly on the plane of human values." Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth .Amendlments, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 945, 991 (1977).
"' See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550-52 (1991);
United States v. Madison, 936 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1991).
m Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1556 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('he Court
mistakenly hearkens back to common law, while ignoring the expansive approach that the
Court has taken in Fourth Ameidment analysis since Katz and Tery.'9.
' See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
3 See State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Or. 1988).
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conclude that citizens must accede to a society in which police officers
may use deception,'" but not intimidation, when attempting to restrain
a citizen's freedom of movement. If Fourth Amendment concepts of
privacy force citizens to accept the hard reality of deceptive confi-
dants' and good faith intrusions,' the amendment's concept of
liberty may require citizens to endure certain forms of police decep-
tion." Conversely, a Fourth Amendment which does not permit police
to tap telephones on a mere whim should refuse to tolerate police firing
weapons, chasing, or threatening citizens without reasonable cause. To
hold otherwise, as Hodari does,3 ° encourages police to roam the
streets, menacing and intimidating persons, free of constitutional checks.
Distinguishing between liberty interests that are or are not protected
by the Fourth Amendment destroys the illusion of certainty created by
resting the amendment's coverage upon the factual predicates of touching
or submission. The Court must not purchase that illusion of adjudicative
certainty, however, by forfeiting its constitutional responsibility to
identify the citizenry's legitimate liberty interests; nor must the Court
default on its duty to articulate constitutional standards that protect
" For example, an officer who smiles and initiates a conversation about the weather
may be deceiving a pedestrian into a street encounter or detention that will not be
terminated until the pedestrian dispels the officer's suspicion of criminal activity.
' See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
3 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184 (1990) (stating that when a magistrate
authorizes a search on "seemingly reliable but factually inaccurate information," the
homeowner "suffers one of the inconveniences we all expose ourselves to as the cost of
living in a safe society"); Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455
(1990) (holding that the intrusiveness of sobriety checkpoints is a necessary sacrifice in
order to advance the state's interest in deterring drumken driving).
' -Ihe Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and
citizens, but is designed 'to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement
officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals."' INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 215 (1984) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 554 (1976)).
This author does not suggest that the Court should condone police deception, or that
it properly did so in the White and Hoffa cases. See supra note 358. One can certainly
question whether the police should be able to accomplish by deception that which they
cannot accomplish by force, and whether a policy of deception undermines the public's
trust of government officials. The point is this: however the Court resolves the question
of official deception and coercion, the methodology for resolving such questions should
apply equally to searches and seizures of persons, houses, papers and effects.
"e California conceded that the police officers did not have the requisite "reasonable
suspicion!' necessary to lawfully stop Hodari. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
II S. Ct. 1547, 1549 n.1 (1991). In reaching its opinion, the Court 'rel[ied] entirely
upon the State's concession." Id.
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individual liberty against arbitrary or intimidating police conduct."'
Although the task of identifying fundamental constitutional rights is
always difficult, the Court is not writing on a blank slate.' When
called upon to identify legitimate liberty interests, the Court may draw
upon twenty-five years of judicial interpretation of the legitimate privacy
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Despite its many flaws,
Katz, unlike Hodari, allows the Fourth Amendment to evolve beyond the
common law conventions that existed at the time of the amendment's
passage.
3 7 3
B. Applying Models of Attempted Crimes to Attempted Seizures
The Court's discussion of attempts to seize a person has given birth
to nebulous and confusing concepts of subjective/objective intent' and
the so-called objective perception of a hypothesized reasonable per-
son.375 The proper blend of subjective and objective perspectives is a
familiar theme in the law governing attempted crimes, where the
conflicting views of the subjectivists and the objectivists constitute the
principle schools of thought.37
' 'The mysterious aspect of judicial doctrine-making is the process by which
national values are mediated by the incumbent justices [sic] of the Supreme Court."
Junker, supra note 287, at 1120. See generally John H. Ely, Foreword On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978) (discussing the Supreme Court's role
in defining social values and proclaiming controlling principles).
37 This task of identying basic rights and desirable social values is hardly unique
to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. According to Justice Holmes, the judicial fitaction
necessarily and properly involves "considerations of what is expedient for the community
concerned." HoUAEs, supra note 169, at 35; see also BENIAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATuRE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921):
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: logic,
and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right
conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the
law. Which of these forces shall dominate in any case must depend largely
upon the comparative inportance or value of the social interests that will be
thereby promoted or impaired.
373 In this way, the Fourth Amendment is like the Eighth Amendmnt's cruel and
unusual punishment clause which "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-
01 (1958).
3 See suqra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
'75 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave").
3"' See generally GEORGE P. ThR, RETHINKING CRBMNAL LAW §§ 3.1-3.1.3,
3.3.1-3.3.5 (1978); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Manifest Criminality, Criminal Intent, and the
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Subjectivists maintain that classifying attempts as crimes "provide[s] the
.state with an opportunity to isolate and punish dangerous persons-persons
who subjectively intend to cause social harm."'3 Application of this
principle to the Fourth Amendment would lead a subjectivist to view the
amendment as a device for regulating dangerous governmental
conduct-conduct intended to bring about a constitutionally prohibited harm.
Thus, the protections of the amendment might apply as soon as a government
agent manifests his intent to encroach upon a citizen liberty interests.37
There would be no need to wait for the actual infringement upon liberty to
occur because legal sanctions for attempts seek to prevent future harm?"
t as the Court insists, general deterrence is the essence of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule," Hodari undervalues the importance of
deterring police officers from attempting to seize a person illegally.3
"Metamorphosis of Larceny," 90 YALE L.L 294, 294-96, 310-18 (1980) (applying
subjective/objective intent analysis to the crime of larceny).
3 7JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRMIMAL LAW 335 (1987); see also WAYNE
R- LAFAVE & ASTIm W. ScoTr, JR., CRMINAL LAW § 6.2(b), at 498 (1986) ("There
is just as much need to stop, deter and reform a person who has unsuccessfully attempted
or is attempting to commit a crime [as] one who has already committed such an
offense.").
37 See, e.g., People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567 (N.Y. 1976) ("Any time an
intrusion on the security and privacy of the individual is undertaken with intent to harass
or is based upon mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, the spirit of the Constitution has
been violated ... ."); Butterfoss, supra note 345, at 442 (proposing aper se rule based
on the officer's purpose in initiating the encounter); Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme
Court's Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What is a "Seizure" of a Person Within the
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 619, 655 (1990) (attempted
seizures occur "at the moment of intentional coercion and intimidation by the police
designed to produce a seizure").
" "The deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule focus on the conduct of law
enforcement officers, and on discouraging improper behavior on their part, aid not on the
reaction of the citizen to the show of force." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111
S. Ct. 1547, 1561 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally David D. Friedman,
Impossibility, Subjective Probability, and Punishment for Attempts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD.
179 (1991) (discussing the value of the deterrence objective when there is no probability
of succeeding in the attempted crime); Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment
of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1990) (discussing the justification for punishing
attempts and the magnitude of such punishment).
380 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved"); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
906-08 (1984) (concluding that indiscriminate application of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule may undermine its purpose of deterring future harm).
381 "[U]nder the Court's logic-chopping analysis, the exclusionary rule has no
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Were the Court to adopt the subjectivist's concern for future harm,
Hodari would have to be overturned because it triggers Fourth Amend-
ment coverage only once the harm has occurred: after a citizen's freedom
of movement has already been constrained2' Adoption of the subjecti-
vist's concern would also raise questions about the holding in Brower v.
County of InyoU because if the police officer's intent is the linchpin
which characterizes accidental seizures,' intent should also be the
decisive factor in defining attempted seizures. Taken at face value,
however, Brower, Mendenhall, and Hodari all implicitly reject the
subjectivist's view and more closely approach the objectivist's view-
point.'
application because an attempt to make an unconstitutional seizure is beyond the coverage
of the Fourth Amendment, no matter how outrageous or unreasonable the officer's conduct
may be." Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Hodar
majority "presumed" that few orders to stop would be issued without adequate basis, and
"since policemen do not command 'Stop!' expecting to be ignored, or give chase hoping
to be outrun, it fuilly suffices to apply the deterrent to their genuine, successful seizures."
111 S. Ct. at 1551. The Cour's presumption flies in the face of Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 354 (1983), where a black male who often walked late at night in white
neighborhoods was stopped or arrested fifteen times. Id.; see also Reich, supra note 311,
at 1161 (Professor Reich recounted his personal experience: "I can count nine or ten times
that I have been stopped and questioned in the past few years-almost enough to qualify
me as an adjunct member of the Mafia.").
Whatever the past frequency of unjustified orders to stop, the Hodari decision
encourages police to provoke confrontations and flight in the hope that suspects will
abandon contraband or provide other evidence that could not be lawfully seized if
reasonable justification were required at the time the officer initiaed the confrontation.
Police may now use a threatening but sufficiently slow chase as an evidence-gathering
technique whenever they lack reasonable suspicion for a Teny v. Ohio stop. By provoking
confrontation and flight, the officer may also bootstrap himself into a lawfil seizure of
the suspect, as the sighting of abandoned contraband provides reasonable suspicion for
the subsequent seizure of the suspect's person. See State v. Pressley, 825 P.2d 749, 752
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant's behavior "was susceptible to a number of innocent
explanations and [was] insufficient to justify the stop," but the defendant's reaction to the
officer's approach provided the basis for a valid Terry stop).
3 "[Tihe point at which the interaction between citizen and police officer becomes
a seizure occurs ... only after the officer exercises control over the citizen." Hodari, 499
U.S. 621, 111 S. CL at 1559-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice
Kennedy previously asserted that a seizure occurs "when an individual remains in the
control of law enforcement officials because he reasonably believes, on the basis of their
conduct toward him, that he is not free to go." Michigan v. Chestermut, 486 U.S. 567, 577
(1988) (emphasis added).
m 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
32 See sources cited supra note 378.
" See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551, 1558 (1991);
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While subjectivists would invoke legal sanctions as soon as the actor's
conduct poses a danger of future harm, objectivists would withhold
censure until the conduct has brought about some harmful conse-
quence." s The actor must execute "a substantial step" toward commis-
sion of his goal,' with a substantial step being one that itself causes
social harm." Objectivists, however, do not define social harm in the
limited fashion of Hodari, which focuses on the tangible aspects of
constraining physical movement.' Even in the absence of tangible
injury, objectivists would invoke legal sanctions against conduct which
damages some interest deemed socially valuable?"o For example,
objectivists would prohibit conduct that "disturb[s] the public
repose, 391 is "unnerving to the community,"3' or causes apprehen-
sion, fear or alarm in the community because "someone has set out to do
serious damage ... and to break the accepted rules of social life."'3 3
An objectivist might well spurn the Hodari opinion3  on the ground
that the right of the people to be secure in their persons is disturbed when
police are permitted to accost and pursue citizens on a mere whim or
caprice.
395
Brewer, 489 U.S. at 598-600; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
"3 DRESSLER, supra note 377, at 336 n.10.
3" MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (1962). The Code provides:
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind
of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he:
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circumstances
as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial
step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the
crime.
Id. (emphasis added).
'n See DRESSLER, supra note 377, at 335.
3S9 Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1550.
310 See supra notes 377-78.
391 Clark v. State, 8 S.W. 145, 147 (Tenn. 1888).
39 FLETCHEp, supra note 376, § 3.3 at 144.
39 Thomas Weigend, Why Lady Ldon Should Be Acquitted" The Social Harm in
Attempting the Impossible, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 264 (1977).
3- Contrary to what the Hodari majority suggests, California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549 n.1, fear of police encounters is not solely the lot of the
guilty. See infra text accompanying notes 438-39.
391 "Action based merely on whatever may pique the curiosity of a particular officer
is the antithesis of the objective standards requisite to reasonable conduct and to avoiding
abuse and harassment." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 577 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567 (N.Y. 1976)
("[A]Ithough it might be reasonable for the police at the scene of a crime to segregate and
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The fundamental problem for the objectivist is determining whether
the actor's conduct has proceeded sufficiently far so that it is proper to
invoke legal sanctions against such conduct. Despite Hodari's insistence
that the police must actually touch or control the suspect,396 the legal
significance of an actor's conduct should not turn upon spatial or temporal
factors. To ignore the Fourth Amendment until.physical restraint occurs
decreases the chances of preventing such occurrences." 7 Invoking the
amendment only when the officer has some physical proximity to the
suspect-for example, when the chase is one short step away from
accomplishing physical control-creates an arbitrary line of demarcation
that ignores the possibility that a more physically remote act may infringe
upon liberty interests. A prudent definition of attempted seizures must
relegate spatial and temporal factors to a subordinate role in order to
emphasize the proper balancing of the social interests required to protect
individual freedom against the sometimes conflicting interest in effective
law enforcement. 98
The objectivist's desire to strike an appropriate balance between
individual freedom and collective security'" effectively counters the
subjectivist's contention that Fourth Amendment protections should be
invoked as soon as the officer manifests his intent to interfere with a
citizen's liberty.4  Adoption of the subjectivist's uncompromising
view"' would deny law enforcement officials any opportunity to
approach citizens on the street and ask for their cooperation.4 2 Some-
interview witnesses, the same procedures would not be justified if done on a whim or
caprice.').
' See Hodai, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1550.
" The more society tolerates unjustified chases, the greater the ikelihood that
'unjustified seizures will occur. The Court did not explain why it'!must presume" that only
a few orders to stop will be issued without adequate justification. 111 S. Ct. at 1551.
3' The "impact on the individual's sense of security [must be] balanced against the
utility of the [government's] conduct as a technique of law enforcement." United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9 Id.
People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567 (N.Y. 1976).
4o Under this absolutist view, an attempted seizure would occur when a police officer
smiles at a citizen in hopes that the citizen will stop and chat, the chat consisting of some
questions that the officer would like answered. Although the smiling officer may have
attempted to induce a stop, his actions are so trivial that they fail to constitute
"!meaningful interference" with the citizen's legitimate liberty interests. See United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 n.5 (1984).
40 In fairness, it must be noted that the subjectivist's view states that officers may not
approach a citizen in the absence of some articulable justification for approaching the
citizen. De Bou, 352 N.E.2d at 567.
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times there is no harm in asking,4 3 and there are such things as truly
voluntary encounters between police and citizens. ' An objective
analysis of the officer's unilateral conduct when approaching the citizen
would illustrate the distinction between truly voluntary encounters and
attempted seizures. If the officer's conduct imposes upon the populace the
type of unacceptable social conditions that the Fourth Amendment seeks
to prohibit-if the officer's conduct disturbs the public repose, is unnerving
to the community, or causes apprehension, fear or alarm in the communi-
ty--such conduct must be subjected to judicial scmtiny °5 The harm
caused by a violation of this conceptualization of the Fourth Amendment
is to society's security, making society the aggrieved party rather than the
individual selected for police scrutiny. The need to regulate improper
police conduct does not retroactively evaporate merely because the
particular target of police harassment refuses to surrender his liberty and
submit to a "genuine, successful seizure."'  An individual's courage or
luck in avoiding a completed seizure does not dissipate the social harm
that flows from the attempt to seize him.
The harm that matters most to society as a whole, is the diminished
sense of security that neighbors and friends may feel when they learn
of the police misconduct. Totalitarian governments do not cow their
citizens by regularly ransacking all their homes; the threat is usually
enough. At their worst, illegal searches can represent such threats,
sending a signal to the community that people who displease the
" MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.1 cmt. at 258 (1975)
(suggesting that police should be allowed "to seek cooperation, even where this may
involve inconvenience or embarrassment for the citizen").
[T]here is a fundamental difference between the right of an officer to inquire
and the right of an officer to pursue and seize .... Although an officer is
entitled to inquire, he is not in our system of justice entitled to a response and
may not pursue or seize a person simply because a response to his inquiry has
not been forthcoming .... (citations omitted).
People v. Madera, 596 N.Y.S.2d 766, 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
4 It is clear that a voluntary encounter occurs when the citizen initiates contact with
the police officer. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 635 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982) ("appellant was not tracked down, but was free to choose whether to encounter the
police and he elected to do so"). But see State v. Saia, 302 So. 2d 869, 873 (La. 1974)
("Police officers cannot actively create 'street encounters' unless they have knowledge of
suspicious facts and circumstances sufficient to allow them to infringe on the suspect's
right to be free from governmental interference.").
40 See supra notes 391-93 and accompanying text.
'0 See William I Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedes, 77 VA. L. REV.
881, 902 (1991).
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authorities, whether or not they commit crimes, can expect unpleasant
treatment. 47
An objective approach to attempted seizures compels the Court to
focus on the officer's unilateral conduct and to identify the point at which
the officer's encounter with a presumptively innocent citizen significantly
threatens the very liberties that the amendment seeks to protect" 0 Once
again, the road leads back to Katz and the previous suggestion that the
Katz approach for identifying protected privacy interests can be utilized
to identify protected liberty interests threatened by attempted seizures.'
CONCLUSION
"If the law supposes that .... the law is a ass-a idiot!" 410
With all due respect to the Court, the holding in California v. Hodari
D.41" evokes Dickens' caustic comment on rules of law that fail to
comport with common sense. Less than three weeks after authoring the
opinion in Hodari, Justice Scalia criticized the Court in County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin for subjecting arrested citizens to a "Dickensian
bureaucratic machine '4U that fosters "the image of a system of justice
that has lost its ancient sense of priority, a system that few Americans
would recognize as our own."4 1 3 Those words can be turned back on
the Justice by asking how many citizens would accept that the Fourth
Amendment imposes restrictions on a police officer's "'merely touching,
however, slightly, the body of the accused,' 4 4 but that "a police
officer may now fire his weapon at an innocent citizen and not implicate
the Fourth Amendment-as long as he misses his target." 415 By failing
to deal in intelligible ways with the citizenry's legitimate liberty interests,
Hodari ignores the role of legal discourse "as an important force of social
47 id.
' See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
40See suqra text accompanying notes 356-72.
410 CHARLES DICKENS, OivE TWIsT 403 (Chales Dickens ed., Bantam Books 1981)
(1867).
41' 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
412 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1677 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
41 Id
414 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (quoting RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 41 cmt. h (1934)).
41S 111 S. CL at 1552 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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definition and cohesion, placing the individual ... in a comprehensible
public world in ways that she can respect.' 4 6
If common sense and logic must sometimes defer to history, 7 the
Court must penetrate the surface of common law arrests in order to reach
a broader understanding of the full panoply of common law protections
against an officer's unjustified show of authority toward citizens. In
addition to "genuine, successful arrests, ' 418 the common law addressed
attempted arrests,419  false arrests,42  and assaults42e ' committed by
police officers and other citizens.4' If the Court has incorporated
something less than the full arsenal of common law restrictions' upon
police authority into the Fourth Amendment, the Court has failed to
explain its process of selective incorporation. The fact that the common
law dealt with false arrests and assaults in separate proceedings against
the offending police officer is not a determinative factor.424 In the
absence of an exclusionary rule, the officer's misconduct had no bearing
on the conviction or acquittal of the arrested citizen. Thus, the propriety
of the officer's conduct was necessarily addressed in a separate judicial
416 WHI=E, supra note 1, at 178.
417 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 429 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(stating that warrantless arrests in public are permitted because 'logic sometimes must
defer to history and experience").
419 Stuntz, supra note 406, at 902.
419 "[Ihe officer may subject himself to liability if he undertakes to make an arrest
without being privileged by law to do so." Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. at 1553 n.7
(Stevens, L., dissenting).
4' The common law misdemeanor of false arrest or false imprisonment "results from
any unlawful exercise or show of force by which a person is compelled to remain where
he does not wish to remain or go where he does not wish to go." PERKINS & BOYCE,
supra note 70, at 224.
41 See id. at 179 for examples of common law assaults perpetrated by a show of
force or authority which caused the victim to forfeit some right or liberty. Examples
include the following: riding after a person in such a manner as to compel him to take
shelter in order to avoid being beaten; causing another to change his plans by brandishing
a deadly weapon within range; repeatedly accosting a young girl on the street with an
improper solicitation, causing her to flee in fright. 1d; see also Hawkins v. State, 758
S.W.2d 255, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ("actions designed to control the direction of
[the suspect's] movement by 'closing in' on him"); People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451,
462 (Mich. 1985) ("As soon as the officers began their pursuit, defendant's freedom was
restricted."), cert. granted, 475 U.S. 1094, and cert. dismissed, 478 U.S. 1017 (1986).
- Short of arrest, seizure or assault the officer's approach to a citizen may fall within
the concept of a "common-law inquiry that must be supported by founded suspicion that
criminality is afoot." People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 210 (N.Y. 1992).
- See supra notes 419-21 and accompanying text.
4'4 See supra notes 419-21 and accompanying text.
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hearing.4' Hodari once again suggests that the Court's dissatisfaction
with the remedy of exclusion has led it to misconstrue the substantive
rights embodied in the Fourth Amendment.4
When Fourth Amendment interpretation moves beyond common law
precedents and is seen as a way of discussing fundamental values' 27 and
about people,428 the last decade of Fourth Amendment cases reveals the
Court's view of what kind of nation we are. A citizen who erects no
trespassing signs on his "open fields" has no protection against police
trespass,4 while a homeowner who fails to build a roof over his yard
invites aerial surveillance.43 A traveller entering our country can be
held for hours without a warrant or probable cause until she consents to
an x-ray or performs a monitored bowel movement.43 Motorists who
have aroused no suspicion whatsoever can be stopped at sobriety check-
points" or subjected to a high speed pursuit culminating in a fatal
crash 33 Brower and Hodari complete this troubled view of individual
'2 See sources cited supra note 421.
'u California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1559; see also Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 157 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("If the court is troubled by the
practical impact of the exclusionary rule, it should face the issue of that rule's continued
validity squarely instead of distorting other doctrines in an attempt to reach what are
perceived as the correct results in specific cases."). See generally Paul R. Joseph & J.
Michael Hunter, Circumventing the Exclusionary Rule Through the Issue of Standing, 10
J. CONTEMP. L. 57 (1984) (discussing the possibility that prosecutors will abuse the
standing rules to avoid exclusion of evidence under the Fourth Amendment); William A.
Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Challenge
Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1975) (clarifying the distinction between use
of standing on Fourth Amendment challenges to deny defendant's objection to search and
seizure evidence and a challenge to the search or seizure itself).
4 See supra note 26.
4
n See generally James B. White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About
People, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 165 (identifying the values and policies which underlie the
decisions of several Supreme Court cases).
42 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (remanding the case for dpplication
of the open fields doctrine to a search which resulted in the discovery of a marijuana
crop).
430 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (aerial surveillance leading to a search
wanant); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
431 United States v. Montoya do Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) ("[D]etention of
traveler at the border, beyond the scope of routine customs search and inspection, is
justified at its inception if customs agents ... reasonably suspect that the traveller is
smuggling contraband ..... ).
4"2 Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d
200 (6th Cir. 1986) (no seizure results when police chase results in an accident).
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freedoms in America by resting the protections of the Fourth Amendment
on the slippery concepts of a police officer's "objective intent!" and
by refusing to require that an officer have a good cause belief that the
law. has been violated before attempting any seizure of a citizen.435
Faced with conflicting demands for "safe streets" and freedom of
movement on those streets, the Court has opted to increase law enforce-
ment powers by decreasing the protections of the Fourth Amendment
Although some sacrifice of individual freedom inevitably accom-
panies an expansion in law enforcement powers, it is not true, as the
Court suggests, that the sacrifice falls primarily on the guilty. Each
erosion of Fourth Amendment liberties contributes to a collective loss of
security experienced by blameworthy and innocent citizens alike.437 All
citizens who walk our streets now expose themselves to arbitrary and
unreviewable exercises of police power in the form of encounters,
confrontations, or pursuit forced on them by the police. "To be law
abiding is not necessarily to be spotless, and even the most virtuous can
be unlucky. Unwanted attention from the local police need not be less
discomforting simply because one's secrets are not the stuff of criminal
prosecutions." '  A citizen's desire to avoid discomforting police
scrutiny need not suggest criminality; it may merely reflect a legitimate
desire for autonomy and a refusal to submit to unwarranted encounters
with police 39
The present-day Court also needs to be reminded that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect the security of all citizens, innocent
44 See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
43' See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.436 See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452 (Court unconcerned with roadblock generating fear
in a motorist who has been drinking); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531, 543 (1985) (guilty defendant "alone was responsible for much of the duration and
discomfort of the seizure"). The Court seems to accept that "the police treat people badly;
only bad people get into the clutches of the police; bad people deserve what they get"
SYBILLE BEDFORD, THE FACES OF JusTIcE 242 (1961).
4"The right to be free from arbitrary and oppressive governmental interference with
one's freedom of person and of place is an essential precondition to the exercise of all the
other rights, including those of expression and association, upon which our democratic
system of self-government rests." WHITE, supra note 1, at 208.
411 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting). By placing police "encounters" with
citizens beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the courts 'leave the individual at
the mercy of the police ... [and] deny the protection [of the amendment] to those most
in need of it--those individuals who have not given the police probable cause to act."
Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Functional Observation in the Law of Search and
Seizure: A SYudy in Misconception, 71 DIcK. L. REv. 379, 418-19 (1967).
419 See Mascolo, supra note 438, at 419.
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and guilty alike. After all, the amendment grew out of the American
colonists' experience with English customs officials' oppressive searches
and seizures of suspected smugglers of tea, molasses and other illegally
imported goods." Our nation's founders, innocent and guilty alike,
demonstrated that unrestricted search and seizure creates the raw material
of alienation and rebellion. 1 The next rebellion, if it comes, will come
in the form of inner city riots by blacks and other minorities who are the
ones most often subjected to unbridled police efforts to control street
crime."2 The nation's difficult but unavoidable task is to regain control
of America's "mean streets" without relinquishing control to the
police.44 3
The refusal to accord constitutional significance to attempted and
accidental seizures' is the latest manifestation of the Court's systemat-
ic distortion of the Fourth Amendment in furtherance of the Justices'
ideological tilt toward governmental power and oppression at the expense
of cherished freedoms such as personal liberty. The right of the people
to be secure against unreasonable seizures is an intangible value"4
4" "He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from
oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to
himself." 2 TME CoMPLET WRmNGs oF THOMAS PAINE 588 (P. Foner ed., 1945).
"The Fourth Amendment guarantees that the liberty of even the criminals among us
will not be restrained without an objectively reasonable basis." United States v. Wilson,
953 F.2d 116, 127 (4th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the Fourth Amendment applies "to the innocent and the
guilty alik"); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies
involving not very nice people"), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
441 See William J. Cuddihy, Fourth Amendment (Historical Origins), in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF THE AMEIMCAN CONSTg.ON 761-63 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1986).
442 The crackdown on street crime "encourages greater surveillance and harassment
of those black citizens who are most vulnerable to unjustified interference because they
resemble the lawbreakers in age, gender, and class." Regina Austin, "The Black
Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769,
1773-74 (1992).44
"I[]he power structure has been tricked and manipulated into thinking that we
have to let the rogue police do what they want to do." Darlene Ricker, Holding Out, 78
A.B.A. . 48, 50 (Aug. 1992) (quoting Gerard Papa, Esq.).
' See supra notes 144-211 and accompanying text (discussing accidental seizures);
supra notes 212-351 and accompanying text (discussing attempted seizures).
4"s See Weinreb, supra note 27, at 83.
It is risky business to speculate how human beings will adapt to a changed
environment. Without being very precise, experience suggests that if we were
to lose the cloak of anonymity in public places, we should be less open, more
crafty, more secretive, and more isolated than we are now. There is no way to
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which does not carry with it the immediate sense of urgency engendered
by tangible evidence of a rising crime rate and a drug crisis in our
nation."' However, in its rush to enhance law enforcement power the
Court has neglected its
traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is
overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security
without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution
requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the
judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal
trials." 7
establish that our behavior now is better (more ' natural," or more 'human," or
more pleasant) than it would be if we expected and had less privacy. In the end
we must rely on an unproved vision of man in society.
Id.
4' Justice Stevens recently charged that the Court "has become a loyal foot soldier
in the Executive's fight against crime." California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 2002
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the Court has upheld the constitutionality of searches in
27 of 30 Fourth Amendment cases involving narcotics). Statistical evidence indicates that
the lower courts have also joined in the War on Drugs. The number of defendants charged
and convicted of drug law violations increased 134% between 1980 and 1986. The
corresponding increase in convictions for non-drug offenses was 27%. Bureau of Justice
Statistics Special Report, Drug Law Violators, 1980-86, p. 1 (June 1988). See generally
Peter A. Winn, Seizures of Private Property in the War Against Drugs: What Process is
Due?, 41 Sw. L.J. 1111 (1988); Stephen A. Saltzburg, ANOTHER VICTm OF ILEGAL
NARCOTICs: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (As ILLUSTRATED BY THE OPEN FIELDS
DOCIUNE), 48 U. Prr. L. REV. 1 (1986).
If these be hard times in which we live, it may be wise to realize that the times often
appear uniquely difficult to those who live them. Some 300 years ago Lord Hale
authorized search wanants on the ground of "necessity, especially in these times, where
felonies and robberies are so frequent." LANDYNSKI, spra note 27, at 26-27.
447 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
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